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BLUE CHIP STAMPS 
v. 
MANOR DRUG STORES 
Preliminary Memo 
Cert. to CA 9 
~. ~&.:/- ~ . ~ 11-J~ . r -c.. ""''"'fr~y 
(Browning, Choy~ Hufstedler 
dissenting) ~~~~~~~~~~ 
Federal/Civil (Securities) 
Summary: This case presents the question of the continuing 
viability of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 905 (1952) which limited the. plaintiff class 
in Rule lO(b) (5) damage actions to actual purchasers or sellers of 
securities in the transaction called into question. . Resps ~ n the 
immediate case were required to be offered certain shares of Blue 
Chip as part of a plan of reorganization incorporated in an 
-2-
antitrust consent decree. Because of an allegedly misleading over-
- t:::::;:... 
pessimistic prospectus, they did not purchase the offered shares. 
They later filed suit in USDC, seeking _the difference between the 
offering price of the shares and their asserted fair market value. 
They presented three theories: liability of petrs under lO(b) (5)~ 
liability under §12 of the 1933 Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §77L]~ 
and liability of petr to them under the consent decree as its third 
party beneficiaries. The complaint was dismissed for failure to 
state a claim by USDC [Kelleher] because of the literal inappli-
c ability of §12, the wording of the consent decree, and the fajlure 
to satisfy the Birnbaum standing requirement for Rule lO(b) (5) . . A 
panel 9f the 9th Ci.rcuit reversed holding that resps did have lO(b) 
(5) standing (without passing on the remaining clajms) over a 
vigorous dissent by Judge Hufstedler and the 9th Circuit denied 
rehearing en bane with f~ve judges dissenting. Petr now renews 
his Birnbaum argument before this Court. 
Facts: Blue Chip Stamp is a company engaged in providing and 
redeeming trading stamps used by retail stores. Until 1967, it was 
90% owned by eight large chain grocery corporations (also petrs 
here and defendants below) who used its stamps. A number of other 
small retailers also used the stamps but owned none of Blue Chip's 
stock. An antitrust consent decree entered in that year between 
the Government and the petrs provided for a reorganizatjon of Blue 
Chip jn order to reduce the % of its shares held by the big retailers 
, ' 
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and increase the % of shares held by smaller retailers. The decree 
provided that (after a change of name reorganization was consumated) 
Blue Chip was to make an offering of 621,000 shares (43% of the 
company) first to the small retailers with any unpurchased shares 
being offered to others. The number of shares offered to each 
small retailer was proportional to his prior stamp usage. The 
-----------------------------------------------------offering was in package units with each package costing $100 and 
consisting of three shares of common stock and one $100 comple-tely 
subordinated debenture. Resps allege that the actual fair market 
value of th i s package was $315. 
Some 60% of t he offering was purchased by small retailers. 
The re~aining 40% was not and seses as class representatives of the 
non-accepting retailers seek some $20 million dollars in damages, 
representing the aggregate of the difference between the offering 
price of the non-accepted shares and the allegedly higher fair 
market value of the non-accepted shares at the time of sale. The 
gravamen of resps' complaint is that the prospectus distributed in 
connection with the offering (as required by §4 of the 1933 
Securities Act) was materially misleading in its over-pessimistic 
description of Blue Chip and its prospects. For example, the 
prospectus listed as potential contingent liabilities some $29 
million in pending legal claims against Blue Chip although the 
company and its control shareholders knew that many of these 
claims were frivolous and in fact later settled these claims for 
'-· 
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slightly over $1 million. 
Rule 10 (b) (5), adopted pursuant to §10 (b) of the 1934 Secud ties 
Exchange Act and similar in language to that section, prov1des in 
pertinent part that "it shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, ••• in connection with the purchase or sale of any -
security." 
Contention: The sole question presented in this petition is 
whether the CA erred in holding that the resps, who neither purchased 
t \\ 
nor sold securities, had the requisite standing to maintain a dama~e 
action under Rul_;;_J O..(b,) (5) • --
The CA majority [Pet. at Al-All] reasoned that the purpose of 
the statute and rule were to insure a well :informed body of investors 
so that the absence of a purchase or sale by a named plaintiff was 
irrelevant to the rule's objective, noting for example that the SEC 
in an amicus brief in this case called for total abandonment of 
Birnbaum's purchaser/seller standing requirement. Various cases for 
example allowed plaintiffs, who could not maintain a damage act1on 
because of failure to meet the purchaser/seller rule, to maintain an 
action for injunctive relief. To the extent that the stand1ng rule 
remains applicable, it does so only where other factors not presented 
in the instant case are present. Normally where the plaintiff has 
neither purchased nor sold, it is :impossible for him to prove either 
that he would have done so if the misleading conduct had not occurred 
-5-
or at what price and when he would have done so. Thus the purchaser/ 
seller "standing" rule is only a shorthand for saying that on the 
alleged facts there is a failure of proof on both causaljty and loss. 
Where a prior contractual relationship such as an option exists, the 
"standing" rule does not apply since there is objective proof of an 
intent to purchase or sell and a measure of damages may be determined. 
Here the consent decree was the "functional equivalent" of a --
prior contractual arrangement since it specified a discrete group of 
offerees and a fixed price. It provides objective evidence of both 
causality and damages and hence the "standing" requirement sjmply 
doesn't apply. 
~ 
J~dge Hufstedler didn't agree. The decision conflicts those 
""' 
of every other circuit applying the purchaser/seller standing rule and 
seeks to use a legal fiction to expand the reach of lO(b) (5). While 
decisions do recognize that plaintiffs holding contractual obligations 
to purchase/sell (such as options or puts) do have standing even in 
the absence of an executed purchase or sale, they do so because the 
'purchase' .. each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwjse -~ ,__ "'--=' \\ 
statute it!;lf [15 u.s.c. §78c (a)] ~s that "the terms 'buy' and 
acquire''. A consent decree of course is not such a contract under 
this Court's decisions. It creates no rights of enforcement jn 
either the potential purchaser or the potential seller under a long 
line of this Court's decisions. If the standing rule exjsts, then 
the presence or absence of proof of causation or damages js jrrelevant 
'• 
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to whether or not it is met. Although injunctive relief has been 
granted to non-Birnbaum plaintiffs, this is because preventive 
relief ought not be denied where the fraud hasn't been consumated 
and because this form of relief doesn't involve the staggering 
exposures to liability involved in damage suits by non-purchasers 
and non-sellers. There is no logical distinction between these 
non-purchaser offerees and any others in a public offering. At 
the heart of the majority's decision is a misunderstanding of the 
role of standing in the federal system. It is not a form of snap 
judgement pn the nature of the plaintiff's proof but rather a 
c onfinement of remedy to that class of persons whom Congress intended 
t o have it. The loosening or elimination of the purchaser/seller 
rule may incrementally increase disclosure but it will certainly 
generate additional federal litigation, impose draconian damages on 
offerors drastically increasing the cost of marketing securities, 
invite strike suits, and drastically unsettle the market through 
adding new, and unknown risk factors. If the decision of the 
majority applies only to this discrete group of offerees, then it is 
simply bad law since there is no meaningful distinction between them 
and other non-purchasers. It is more likely that this decision 
reaches all non-purchasers who may now await market developments 
without risk, claiming deception caused non-buying if the value of 
the securities proves more promising than the offeror's glum 
predictions or claiming that deception caused non-selling if a rosy 
prospectus is followed by a market decline. 
-7-
The USDC mechanically applied Birnbaum's purchaser/seller rule. 
Petrs generally repeat the CA dissent. They point out that the 2d, 
3rd, 5th, 6th, and 8th Circuits apply Birnbaum while the 7th Circuit 
followed the 9th Circuit's lead in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3595 
(April 22, 1974) (Burger, C.J., Douglas and White, J.J. dissenting 
from denial: Powell, J. not participating). They further argue that 
even Eason is distinguishable since the fraud alleged there was in 
connection with a transfer of securities whereas here there was no 
transfer and resps aren't purchasers, sellers, or investors. They 
'-· point out that many cases have held that there are no derjvative 
individual rights from an anti-trust consent decree. [Pet. at 19-22]. 
Finally, they argue that the decision conflicts with the entire policy 
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts which was to encourage disclosure of all 
possible adverse aspects of a company in order to preclude "puffing" 
of securities. 
Resps argue that the instant decision is not tn conflict w~th 
Birnbaum since only a purely mechanistic application of Birnbaum 
would have denied them standing. Because of their right or entitlement 
to purchase the shares under the consent decree, they stand jn the 
same position as an option holder. They valiantly seek to distinguish 
many cases applying the Birnbaum rule and rely on Eason. 
Discussion: The status of the Birnbaum doctrine jn light of 






unsettled question in the federal securities area. This decision 
constitutes a thinly veiled overruling of the doctrine in the 9th 
Circuit as Judge Hufstedler points out and replaces the purchaser/ 
seller rule with an inquiry into the quantum of available evidence 
on causation and damages. Because the federal securities laws apply 
largely to issuers listed on national exchanges, whose shares are sold 
interstate, and because of the extremely important ramifications of 
the elimination of the rule, the current conflicting decisions. create 
grave and unfair business uncertainties. 
For e~ample, §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, taken together with 
Birnbaum under R. lO(b) (5), have meant that only actual purchasers 
of newly offered shares could recover for inaccuracies in a pro-
spectus. Such purchasers of course have nothing to recover jf the 
prospectus was over-gloomy and the company does better than the 
prospectus indicates. The result has been consistently over-
pessimistic prospectuses as a hedge against potential liability. 
Exit Birnbaum and in comes the disappointed non-purchaser offeree - -
with a 10 (b) (5) cause of action. 
The opinions in the case fully articulate the factors going 
either way and the status of this rule ought to be decided by the 
Court. 
There is a response. 
10/29/74 O'Neill Ops in Pet. 
Court CA - 9 Voted on .. . ... .. .. .... . ' . . . , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned ..... . ..... .. .. . .. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM · 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Penny Clark 
DATE: March 18, 1975 
No. 74-124 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 
The issue in this case is whether § lO(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule lOb-5 
afford a cause of action for damages to a person who alleges 
that fraudulent misrepresentations within the definition of 
that rule causelhim not to buy a security that he could have 
purchased. This is not an issue of standing,although it is 
usually described in those terms. It has nothing to do with 
Article III; it is solely an issue of the scope of the lOb-5 
cause of action. This Court has never endorsed the Birnbaum 
rule and is writing on a clean slate. 
I see two steps in the analysis of the issue: first, 
whether a person fraudulently induced not to buy a security 
is within the scope of protection of the securities acts; 
second, even if he is, whether the class of injuries is so 
speculative that, as a matter of policy, the Court should 
deny recovery in damages. 
question one. The SEC's amicus brief takes the position 
that the securities acts were intended to protect all 
investors from misrepresentation in connection with all 
securities transactions. Petitioner takes a narro~r view 
2. 
asserting that the securities acts are primarily designed 
to prevent "puffing", and that overemphasis of negative 
factors in a prospectus does not violate the policies of the 
acts. This seems too narrow a view of the securities acts. 
Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-S have no such restrictions: they 
prohibit all misrepresentations and fraudulent silences in 
connection with securities transactions, whatever the effect ------on investors or potential investors. I can easily imagine 
a fraudulent scheme in which a bad guy trying to obtain control 
of a corporation would put out false information to dissuade 
other potential investors from purchasing, or to induce current 
stockholders to sell their holdings. I think both class es of 
investors are within the umbrella of the securities acts' 
protection. I would therefore shift the burden of the analysis 
to the second question. 
Question two. As a general proposition, I think it 
cannot be denied that the class of claims by persons dissuaded 
from buying securities is more speculative than the class of 
claims by persons who were induced to buy, to sell, or to hold 
securities they already owned. All of these categories include 
a certain number of speculative problems: "what I would have ------- -..... 
done if I had known the truth" _is always difficult of proof. 
The issues are even more speculative in class actions. 
Nonetheless, if there is an actual purchase or sale, there 
is a point of reference for measuring damages. And if the 
plaintiff claims that he held securities that would have 
3. 
sold but for the defendant's fraud, we at least know how 
many shares he owned. Even when there is only a contract for 
sale or purchase of securities, the plaintiff's claim that he 
(or exeltcis~ ~ Of~) 
was induced not to honor the contractAhas some ring of certainty. 
In a case like Blue Chip Stamps, however, the only certain 
factor is the maximum subscription each plaintiff was offered. -
(And most cases of claimants who were persuaded not to buy 
will lack even that benchmark.) To prove injury, the plaintiff 
should have to establish that he intended to buy a certain 
number of shares, that he had or could have obtained the money 
to purchase them, and that the defendant's misrepresentation 
induced him not to buy the stock. If he should establish all 
this, there is still a question whether his injury - loss of 
a speculative chance of gain - should be cognizable in damages. 
~The claimant has suffered no out-of-pocket loss. In Blue 
Chip Stamps, the respondents ask the difference between the 
"bargain" price of the offering and the market value of the 
securities as of the time they were offered. This measures 
the respondents' loss of an expectation, however, and even 
at that is more certain than the expectation loss of most 
persons who would claim they were fraudulently dissuaded from 
purchasing a security. In sum, the category of claims that 
Blue Chip Stamps represents is more speculative than other 
categories of actions under Rule lOb-5. One can reasonably 
expect that far more of these suits would be started than 
won, especially if the plaintiffs are required to sustain 
an appropriately severe burden of proof. 
4. 
Against the problems of recognizing such a speculative 
' 
category of claims are the policies that prompted a private 
cause of action under lOb-S in the first place: the inadequacy 
of the SEC's investigative and enforcement resources, and the 
potential for reinforcement by private suits enforcing the 
obligations imposed by the securities acts. Some of the civil 
remedies expressly included in the statutes seem to have such 
an enforcement purpose; not all are strictly compensatory. 
The SEC says that private enforcement is helpful. Amicus 
participation in this case, however, is not the only method 
open to it for broadening the range of private enforcement: 
the SEC's rulemaking power is probably broad enough to iustify 
changing Rule lOb-S to eliminate any "purchaser-seller" 
l~on. Perhaps the rulemakers and the litigators have 
a different set of priorities. 
Recommendation: I see two alternatives: to hold that 
persons dissuaded from buying securities may have a cause 
of action under lOb-S if they meet an appropriate burden of 
proof on reliance and injury; or to hold that there is no 
cause of action. The practical difference between the two 
choices is whether these cases will be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim or whether they will go to summary judgment 
or trial. My inclination is to deny the cause of action -
not on the basis of the mechanical "purchaser-seller" rule, 
but because the claimed injury is too speculative to be 
5. 
cognizable in an action for damages. I think wholly different 
considerations should apply if the issue is availability of 
injunctive relief, and I would not embrace the purchaser-seller 
~ 
rule as a general proposi• tion but would await further 
~ 
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..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~u:p-rttttt C!fourl of tqt 'Jtttt:i!elt .§ta'Ui 
~a:.s:Jri:ttgt~ ~. cq. 2llgtJ1~ 
May 9, 1975 
Re: No. 74-124 - Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 
Dear Bill: 
In due course I shall be writing a dissenting opinion for 
this case. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
%>nt1rt1ttt ~ou.rt of tfrt 'Pltitt~ ~ta.4s 
'IDas!yiugto-n. gl. <!J. 20giJt~ 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL May 12, 197 5 
Re : No. 74-124 -- Blue Chip Stamps v . Manor Drug Stores 
Dear Bill : 
I shall wait to see Harry's dissent . 
Sincerely, 
7ftr. 
T. M . 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc : The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.:§uprttttt (!Jmtrl cf tfrt ~b .§tatts-
'Jll!fas-Jri:ngtcn. ~. ~ 20~ JI. j 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
. . .. 
May 12, 1975 
74-124 - Blue Chip Stamps, et al. 
v. Manor Drug Stores, Etc. 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
(· .. , 
-
.inpunu <!f.ru:rt ttf tJr~ ~~b .jtatt~ 
._.asfringhm. ~. <!f. 2!1bT'l-~ 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
May 16, 1975 
Re: No. 74-124 - Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w~. J. BRENNAN, JR. 
.§utrtcntt <!Jcurt of tlp! ~ti:tcb .;%italtg 
2JUc;ur~mgtcn. ~. <q. 20§Jt.~ 
May 27 , 1975 
RE: No. 74-124 Blue Chip Stamps v . Manor Drug 
Stores , etc . 
Dear Harry : 
Please join me in your fine dissent . 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
CHAM6ERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.. 
~ltprttttt ~ourl cf fltt ~~ ~taftg 
~:t$Irbtg-Ltn. ~. <!f. ':zngr'l-~ 
May 29, 1975 
/ 
Re: No. 74-124 - Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
.iu:vrtmt <!}ttttd of tfrt ~b .it,aftg 
11Jaslrittgtttn.l9. <!}. 2ll.;t~.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 2, 197 5 
Re: No. 74-124, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store s 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
.in:prttm <!Jnnrt i!f f!rt 'J.ll.rri±tb .:§tatts-
~a,glyingtcn. ~. C!J. 2!!~'!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS June 2, 1975 
Dear Harry: 
Kindly join me in your dissent 
in BLUE CHIP v. MANOR DRUG STORES, 74-124. 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
.. 
/ 
June 4, 1975 
No. 74-124 Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Prus Stores, Etc. 
Dear Potter: 
Thank you for joining my concurring opinion. You may 
recall our conversation~ about the majority being charged 
with "callousness toward the investing public". I enclose 
a second draft of my concurring opinion, in which , I respond 
to Harry's charges. 
1 I have not yet circulated this draft, and would appreciate' 
your views. 





?-fl-ed-vL--' c::A_~ 4) ~ f-
~~-k~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June 4, 1975 
Re: No. 74-124, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores 
Dear Lewis, 
I should appreciate your adding my name to your 
concurring opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.inp:rtmt <!Jllltrl d tlrt ~~ ~htttg 
'Jl'a.tr Jri:ngtcn, ~. <!J. 2ll~J!. ~ 
June 5, 1975 
No. 74-124 - Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, Etc. 
Dear Lewis, 
I think Part II in your amended con-
curring opinion is fine, and gladly join it. 
I have noted in pencil on page 1 of the en-
closed copy an extremely minor suggestion. 
Sincerely yours, 
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Chief ,Jun+~ f'" f. 
Justice t ·1 
Justice Lr f 
Justice St .... a ... · • • 
~.;-v~~ ' Justice White Justice Marshall 
Justice Blackmun 
Justice Powell~ 
From: Rehnquist, J; 
Ciroulated:0 .-J - J9 JQ 
Recirculated=------
~ a..o S. EME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
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~ ~ This case requires us to consider whether the offerees AJ- ,1111 
~L ~ of a stock offering, made pursuant to an antitrust consent M1: •s • s •• V \ If 
- ;-/ decree and registered under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 ~
1 ~- '_ IJ U.S. C.§ 77a et seq. ("the 1933 Act"), may maintain a - -- J 1 A_ , 
'~ PYV private cause of action for money damages where they t:AA•.J.. ~
~ 
 
Py ,.,.~ ,, 
allege that the offeror has violated tire provisions of Rule ~ • 
lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, but ~ 
where they have neither purchased nor sold any of the tt:Z-~
offered shares. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., ~~-1)~~ .. .64~ _. ~ 'I~ 
193 F. 2d 461 (CA2), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), --~ 7~ 
~~ ;f In 1963 the UniWI State: filed • civil antitrust action 
J {) ~) ~ against Blue Chip Stamp Company ("Old Blue Chip"), 
{/ /
1 
? a company in the business of providing trading stamps to 
/ If) (/_} ~ - . retailers, and nine retailers who owned 90% of its shares. 
C 7 1 In 1967 the action was terminated by the entry of a con-
{ 
1
j r ""' sent decree. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 
~ f'YJI '1') ~ F. Supp. 432 (CD Cal. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Thrifty 
) Shoppers Script Co. v, llnited States, 389 U, S. ~ 
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(1968).1 The decree contemplated a plan of reorganiza-
tion whereby Old Blue Chip was to be merged into a 
newly formed corporation "New Blue Chip." The hold-
ings of the majority shareholders of Old Blue Chip were 
to be reduced, and New Blue Chip, one of the petitioners 
here, was required under the plan to offer a substantial 
number of its shares of common stock to retailers who 
had used the stamp service in the past but who were not 
shareholders in the old company. Under the terms of 
the plan, the offering to nonshareholder users was to be 
proportional to past stamp usage and the shares were to 
be offered in units consisting of common stock and 
debentures. 
The reorganization plan was carried out, the offering 
was registered with the SEC as r2quired by the 1933 Act, 
and a prospectus was distributed to all offerees as re-
quired by § 5 of that Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77e. Somewhat 
more than 50% of the offered units were actually pur-
chased. In 1970, two years after the offering, respondent, 
a former user of the stamp service and therefore an 
offeree of the 1968 offering, filed this suit in the United 
States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia. Defendants below and petitioners here are Old 
and New Blue Chip. eight of the nine majority share-
holders of Old Blue Chip, and the directors of New Blue 
Chip (collectively called "Blue Chip") , 
Respondent's complaint alleged, inter alia, that the 
prospectus prepared and distributed by Blue Chip in 
connection with the offering was materially misleading in 
its overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and 
t Neither respondent nor any of the members of his alleged clas~ 
were parties to the antitru:st action. The antitrust decree itself 
provided no plan for the reorgamzation of Old Blue Chip but 
instead ,merely directed the parties to the consent decree to present 
tQ the court such a plan. Appendix, at 27, 31. 
... 
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future prospects. It alleged that Bhle Chip intentionally 
made the prospectus overly pessimistic in order to dis-
courage respondent and other members of the allegedly 7 
large class whom it represents from accepting what was ~ 
intended to be a bargain offer, so that the rejected shares I ~ 
might later be offered to the public at a higher price. 
The complaint alleged that class members because of 
and in reliance on the false and misleading prospectus 
failed to purchase the offered units. Respondent there-
fore sought on behalf of the alleged class some $21,400,000 
in damages representing the lost opportunity to purchase 
the units; the right to purchase the previously rejected 
units at the 1968 price, and in addition, it sought some 
$25,000,000 in exemplary damages. 
The only portion of the litig&.tion thus initiated which 
is before us is whether respondent may base its action 
on Rule 10 (b)(5) of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission without having either bought or sold the shares 
described in the allegedly misleading prospectus. The 
District Court dismissed respondent's complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted.2 
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, respondent pressed only his asserted cls.tim 
under Rule lOb-5, and a divided panel of the Court of 
Appeals sustained his position and reversed the District 
Court.3 After the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en 
bane, we granted Blue Chip's petition for certiorari. 
- U. S. - . Our consideration of the correctness of 
the determination of the Court of Appeals requires us 
to consider what limitations there are on the class of 
plaintiffs who may maintain a private cause of action for 
money damages for violation of Rule lOb-5, and whether 
respondent was within that cla.~s. 
2 The District Court opinion is reported at 339 F. Supp. 35. 
8 The Court of AppNils opmion is reported at 492 F . 2d 138 • 
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II 
During the early days of the "New Deal," Congress 
enacted two landmark statutes regulating securities. 
The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 
U. S. C. § 77a et seq., was described as "an Act to pro-
vide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities 
sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through 
the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and 
for other purposes." The "Securities Exchange Act of 
1934," 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq., 
was described as an Act "to provide for the regulation of 
securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets 
operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through 
the mails, to prevent i'1equitable and unfair practices 
on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes." 
The various sections of the Act of 1933 dealt at some 
length with the required contents of registration state-
ments and prospectuses, and expressly provided for 
private civil causes of action. Section 11 (a) gave a I 
right of action by reason of a false registration statement 
to "~!_ny person acquiring" the security, and § 12 of that 
Act gave a right to sue the seller of a security who had 
engaged in proscribed practices with respect to pro-
spectuses and communication to "the person purchasing 
the said security frem him." - -
"'The Act ol 1934 was divided into two titles. Title I 
was denominated "regulation of securities exchanges," 
and Title II was denominated "amendments to Securi-
ties Act of 1933." Section 10 of the Act of 19,34 made 
it "unlawful for any person-:- . (b) to use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or 8ale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any se-
curity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
t() (t) 
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sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.'' The "Commission" referred to 
in the section was the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion created by ~ 4 (a) of the Act of 1934. Section 29 
of that Act provided that "every contract made in vio-
lation of any provision of this Title or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder" shouid be void. 
In 1942, acting under the authority granted to it by 
§ 10 (b) of the Act of 1934, the Commission promulgated 
Rule 10b-5, providing as follows: 
"§ 240.10b-5 Employment of manipulative and de--ceptive devices. 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
" (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as 
s, fraud or deceit upon any person, 
"i!!_ connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security." 
I 
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act does not by its terms 
provide an express civil remedy for its violation. Nor 
does the history of this provision provide any indication 
that Congress considered the problem of private suits 
under it at the time of its passage, See, e. g., Note, Im-
plied Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 
Harv: L. Rev. 859, 861 (1948); A. Bromberg, Securities 
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Law: Fraud-SEC Rule lOb-5 § 2.2, at 300-340 
(1968); S. Rep. No. 792, ~3d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5-6 
{1934). Similarly there is no indication that the Com-
mission in adopting Rule lOb-5 considered the question 
of private civil remedies under this provision. SEC Se~ 
curities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (1942); Confer-
ence on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 
Bus. Law. 793, 922 ( 1967) ; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel 
Corp., supra, 193 F. 2d, at 463; 3 L. Loss, Securities 
Regulation, at 1469 n. 87 (1961), 
Despite the contrast between the provisions of Rule 
10b-5 and the numerous carefully drawn express civil 
remedies provided in both the Acts of 1933 and 1934/ 
it was held in 1946 by the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pem'!.sylvania that there was 
an implied private right of action under the Rule. Kar-
don v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946), 
I This Court had no occasion to deal with the subject until 20-odd years later, and at that time we confirmed with 
virtually no discussion the overwhelmin consensus of 
the c 1s ourts an cour s o a cause 
o actwn id ex1st. upenntendent of Insurance v, 
B7.iri:ke'rs Life aw:;d Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13 n. 9 
(1971); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 150-154 (1972). Such a conclusion was, of course, 
entirely consistent with the Court's recognition in J. 1, 
Case Corp. v. Borak, 377 TJ. S. 426, 432 (1964), that pri-
vate enforcement of Commission rules may "[provide] a 
necessary supplement to Commission action." 
Within a few years after the seminal Kardon decision, 
4 See, e. g., § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77k; § 12 of the 
1933 Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 771; § 15 of tnc 1933 Act , 15 U. S. C. § 77o; 
§ 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i; § 16 of the 1934 Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 78p; § 18 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78r ; § 20 of tlle' 
1934 Act, 15, U. S, C. ! 78t. 
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded 
that the plaintiff class for purposes of a private damage 
action under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 was limited to 
ac!._ual gurchasers and sellers of securities. Birnbaum v. 
Newport Steel Co1p., supra. 
The Court of Appeals in this case did not repudiate 
Birnbaum ,· indeed, another panel of that court (in an 
opinion by Judge Ely) had but a short time earlier 
affirmed the rule of that case. M aunt Clemmons In-
dustries v. Bell, 464 F. 2d 339 (CA9 1972). But in this 
case a majority of the Court of Appeals found that the 
facts warranted an exception to the Birnbaum rule. For 
the rea::;ons hereinafter stated, we are of the opinion that 
Birnbaum was rightly rlecided, and that it bars respond-
ent from maintaining this suit under Rule lOb-5. 
III 
The panel which decided Birnbaum consisted of Chief 
Judge Swan and Judges Learned Hand and Augustus 
Hand : the opinion was written by the latter. Since 
both § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 proscribed only fraud "in 
connection with the purchase or sale" of securities, and 
since the history of § 10 (b) revealed no congressional 
intention to extend a private civil remedy for money 
damages to other than defrauded purchasers or sellers of 
securities, in contrast to the express civil remedy pro-
vided by § 16 (b) of the 1934 Act, the court concluded 
that the plaintiff class in a Rule lOb-5 action was limited 
to actual purchasers and sellers. 193 F. 2d 461, 463-464. 
Just as this Court had no occasion to consider the 
validity of the Kardon holding that there was a private 
cause of action under Rule lOb-5 until 20-odd years 
later, nearly the same period of time has gone by between 
the Birnbaum decision and our consideration of the case 
now before us. As with Kardon, virtually all lower 
' . 
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federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported 
cases presenting this question over the past quarter cen-
tury have reaffirmed Birnbaum's conclusion that the ... 
plaintiff class for purposes of § To (b) and Rule 10b-5 
private damage action is limited to purchasers and sell-
ers of securities. See 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, 
at 3617. See, e. g., Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F. 2d 
1305, 1311 (CA2 1972); Landry v. FDIC, 486 F. 2d 139, 
156-157 (CA3 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); 
Sargent v. Genesco, 492 F. 2d 750, 763 (CA5 1974); Sim-
mons v. Wolfson, 428 F. 2d 455, 456 (CA6 1970), cert. 
denied, 400 U. S. 999 (1971); City National Bank v. 
Vanderboom, 422 F. 2d 221, 227-228 (CAS), cert. denied, 
399 U.S. 905 (1970); Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. 
Bell, 464 F. 2d 339 (CA9 1972); Jensen v. Voyles, 393 
F. 2d 131, 133 (CAlO 1967). Compare Eason v. Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F. 2d 654 (CA7 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), with Dasho v. Susque-
hanna Corp., 380 F. 2d 262 (CA7), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
977 (1967). 
In 1957 and again in 1959, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission sought from Congress amendment of 
§ 10 (b) to change its wording from "in connection with 
the purchase or sale or any security" to "in connection 
with the purchase or sale of. or any attempt to purchase 
or sell, any security." (Emphasis added.) 103 Cong. 
Rec. 11636 (1957); SEC Legislation, Hearings before 
Subcom. of Sen. Com. on Banking & Currency on 
S. 1178-1182, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 367-368 (1959)'; 
S. 2545, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 1179, 86th 
Cong., 1st Sess, (1959). In the words of a memorandum 
submitted by the Commission to a congressional com-
mittee, the purpose of the proposed change wa,s "to make ' 
section 10 (b) also applicable to manipulative activities 
in cQnnectio!lll with any attempt to purchase or sell any 
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security." Hearings on S. 1178-1182, supra, at 331. 
Opposition to the amendment was based on fears of the 
extension of civil liability under § 10 (b) that it would 
cause. I d., at 368. Neither change was adopted by 
Congress. 
The longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled 
with Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum's reasonable 
interpretation of the wording of § 10 (b), wording which 
is directed towards injury suffered "in connection with 
the purchase and sale" of securities, argues significantly 
in favor of acceptance of the Birnbaum rule by this 
Court. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 413 (1962). 
Available extrinsic evidence from the texts of the 1933 
and 1934 AMS as to tlie congressional scheme in this 
regard, though not conclusive, also tends to support the 
result reached by the Birnbaum court. The wording of 
§ 10 (b) directed at fraud "in connection with the pur-
chase or sale" of securities stands in contrast with the 
parallel antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, § 17 (a), 
15 U. S. C. § 77q,S reaching fraud "in the offer or sale" -- ......_ -: _____... 
I) 
11 § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act provides in wording virtually identical 
. to that of Rule lOb-5 with the exception of the italicized portion 
that: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any 
securities by the use of any means or instntments of transportation 
or communication in interstate commerce "or by the use of the mails, 
directly or indirectly-
" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state. 
ment of a material fact or any omi~sion to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstanr.es under which they were made, not misleading, or 
" (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi. 
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon. 
the purchaseL" (Emphasis added.) 
We express, of course, no opinion on whether § 17 (a) in light of 
the express civil remedies of the 1933 Act gives rises to an implied 
lr 
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of securities. Ci. § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. 77e. 
When Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who \ 
neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble 
in doing so expressly. Cf. § 16 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 78p. 
Section 28 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77bb, 
which limits recovery in any private damage action 
brought under the 1934 Act to "actual damages," like-
wise provides some support for the purchaser-seller rule. 
See, e. (]., A. Bromberg, Securities Law : Fraud-SEC-
Rule lOb-5 § 8.8, at 221 (1968). While the damages 
suffered by purchasers and sellers pursuing a § 10 (b) 
cause of action may on occasion be difficult to ascertain, 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, supra, at 155, 
in the main such purchasers and sellers at least seek to { 
base recovery on a demonstrable number of shares traded. 
In contrast, a putative plaintiff, who neither purchases 
nOr"Sells secunties but sues instead for mtangible eco-
nomiC m ur such as loss of a noncontractual oppor-
tunity to buy or se , is more 1 e y to e see mg a 
largely conjectural and speculative recovery in which 
tile numb'er of Sliares 'irivolved Will depend on the plain-
tiff's subjective hypothesis. Cf. Estate Counseling Serv-
ice v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 303 F. 2d 
527, 533 (CAlO 1962); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F. 2d 
328, 335 (CA2 1911) ; Wolf v. Frank, 477 F. 2d 467, 478 
(CA2 1973) . 
One of the justifications advanced for implication of 
a cause of action under § 10 (b) lies in § 29 (b) of the 
1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78cc, providing that a contract 
cause of action. Compare Greater Iowa Corp . v. McLendon, 378 
F . 2d 783, 788, 791 (CA8 1967), w1th Ftshman v. Raytheon Mfg. 
Corp., 188 F. 2d 783, 787 (CA2 1951) See, e. g., SEC v. Texa8 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F . 2d 833, 867 (CA2 1968) (Opinion of 
Friendly, J., conrurring), cert. demed, 394 U S. 976 (1969) ; 3 
L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1785 (1961 ) . 
''· 
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made in violation of any provision of the 1934 Act is 
voidable at the option of the deceived party.6 See, e. g., 
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 
(ED Pa. 194~); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Insur-
ance Co., 174 F. 2d 799, 815 (CA3 1949); Fischman v. 
Raytheon Manufa.cturing Co., 188 F. 2d 783, 787 
n. 4 (CA2 1951); A. Bromberg, Securities Regulation: 
Fraud-SEC Rule 10b-5 § 2.4 (l)(b) (1968) . But that I 
justification is absent when there is no actual purchase 
or sale of securities, or a contract to do so, affected or 
tainted by a violation of § 10 (b) . Cf. Mount Clemens 
Industries, Inc. v. Bell, supra. 
The principal express nonderivative private civil reme-
dies, created by Congr~ss contemporaneously with the 
passage of § 10 (b), for violations of various provisions 
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are by their terms expressly 
limited to purchasers or sellers of securities. Thus 
§ 11 (a) of the 1933 Act confines the cause of action it 
grants to "any person acquiring the secul'ity" while the 
remedy granted by § 12 of that Act is limited to the 
"person purchasing the said security." Section 9 of the 
8 § 29 (b) of the 1934 Act provide in part : 
44Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chap-
ter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract 
(including any contratt for listing a security on an exchange) here~ 
tofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the 
violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in 
violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation 
thereunder, shall be void, (I) as regards the rights of any person 
who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall 
ltave made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and 
(2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to 
such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual 
knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or perform-
ance of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, 
or regulation. . • ." 
Cf. Decker v. Independent Shares Corp ., 311 U. S. 282 (1940). 
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1934 Act, prohibiting a variety of fraudulent and manip-
ulative devices, limits the express civil remedy provided 
for its violation to "any person who shall purchase or 
sell any security" in a transaction affected by a violation 
of the provision. Section 18 of the 1934 Act, prohibit-
ing false or misleading statements in reports or other 
documents required to be filed by the 1934 Act, limits 
the express remedy provided for its violation to "any 
person ... who ... shall have purchased or sold a secu-
rity at a price which was affected by such statement .... " 
It would indeed be anomalous to impute to Congress an 
intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially 
implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated 
for comparable express causes of action. 
·Having said all this, we would by no means be under-
stood as suggesting that we are able to divine any ex-
press or even clearly implied "intent of Congress" in 
determining whether a claim under Rule 10b-5 should 
be limited to purchasers and sellers under the Act. 
When we deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5, 
we deal with a 'udicial oak which has grown from little 
more than a e,gislatlve acor.n. uc growth may be 
c(ufte consistent witll the congressional enactment and 
with the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it, 
see J. I. Case v. Borak, supra, but it would be disin-
genuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 fore-
ordained the present state of the law with respect to 
Rule 10b-5. I is therefore proper that we consider, 
in addition to the factors a rea y discussed, what may 
be described as policy considerations when we come to 
fl~h out the portions of the law with respect to which 
neither the congressional enactment nor the administra-
tive regulations offer conclusive guidance. 
Three principal classes of potential plaintiffs are pre._ 
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ently barred by the Birnbaum rule. ~ are 
potential purchasers of shares, either in a new offering 
or on the Nation's post-distribution trading markets, 
who allege that they decided not to purchase because 
of an unduly gloomy representation or the omission of 
favorable material which made the issuer appear to be a 
less favorable investment vehicle than it actually was. 
Second are actual shareholders in the issuer who allege 
that they decided not to sell their shares because of an 
unduly rosy representation or a failure to disclose un-
favorable material. Third are shareholders, creditors, - . and perhaps others related to an Issuer who suffered loss 
in the value of their investment due to corporate or 
insider activities in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities which violate Rule 10b-5. It has been held 
that shareholder members of the second and third of 
these classes may frequently be able to circumvent the 
Birnbaum limitation through bringing a derivative action 
on behalf of the corporate issuer if the latter is itself a 
purchaser or seller of securities. See, e. g., Schoenbaum v. 
Firstbrook, 405 F. 2d 215, 219 (CA2 1968), cert. denied 
sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U. S. 906 (1969). 
Bu·t the first of these classes, of which respondent is a \ 
member, can not claim the benefit of such a rule. 
A great majority of the many commentators on the 
issue before us have taken the view that the Birnbaum 
limitation on the plaintiff class in a Rule lOb-5 action 
for damages is an arbitrary restriction which unreason-
ably prevents some deserving plaintiffs from recover-
ing damages which have in fact been caused by violations 
of Rule lOb-5. See, e. g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the 
Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 Va. 
Law Rev. 268 (1968) . The Securities and Exchange 
Commission has filed an amicus brief in this case espous-
ing that same view. We have no doubt that this is 
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indeed a disadvantage of the Birnbaum rule,7 and if it 
had no countervailing advantages It would be undesir-
able as a matter of policy, however much it might be 
supported by precedent and legislative history. But we 
are of the opinion that there are countervailing ad-
vantages to the Birnbaum rule, purely as a matter of 
policy, although those advantages are more difficult to 
articulate than is the disadvantage. 
There has been widespread recognition that litigation 
under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness 
different in degree and in kind from that which accom-
panies litigation in general. This fact was recognized 
by Judge Browning in his opinion for the majority of 
the Court of Appeals in this case, 492 F. 2d 14\, and by 
Judge Hufstedler in her dissenting opinion when she 
said: 
"The purchaser-seller rule has maintained the bal-
ances built into the congressional scheme by per-
mitting damage actions to be brought only by those 
persons whose active participation in the marketing 
transaction promises enforcement of the statute 
without undue risk of abuse of the litigation process 
and without distorting the securities market." 492 
F. 2d 147. 
7 Obviously this disadvantage is <1ttenuatcd to the extent that 
remedies are available to nonpurchasers and nonsellers under state 
law. Cf. § 28 of the Secunties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78bb. See Iroquois Industries, Inc v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 
F . 2d 963, 969 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 399 U. S. 909 (1970) . 
Thus for example in Birnbaum 1tself, while the plaintiffs found 
themselves w1thout federal remedies, the conduct alleged as the· 
gravamen of the federal complaint later provided the basis for· 
recovery in a cause of action based on state law See 3 L. Loss, 
Securities Regulation 1469 (1961) . And in the immediate case,. I 
respondent has filed a state court class act10n held in abeyance-
pending the outcome of this suit. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip· 
Stamps, No , C-51352. (Superioi: Cou:rt. Co.unty of Los Angeles, Cal.). 
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Judge Friendly in commenting on another aspect of 
Rule 10b-5 litigation has referred to the possibility that 
unduly expansive imposition of civil liability "will lead I 
to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by inno-
cent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their 
lawyers .... " SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 
833, 867 (CA2 1968) (concurring opinion). See also 
Boone and McGowan, Standing to Sue under Rule 10b-5, 
49 Tex. L. Rev. 617, 648-649 (1971). 
We believe that the concern expressed for the danger 
of vexatious litigation which could result from a widely / { 
expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 is founded ~ ., , 
in something more substantial than the common com- , 
plaint of the many defendants who would prefer avoiding 
lawsuits entirely to either settling them or trying them. 
These concerns have two largely separate grounds. 
The first of these concerns is that in the field of cor-
porate law even a complaint which by objective stand-
ards may have very little chance of success at trial has a 
settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to 
its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent 
the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or 
summary judgment. The very pendency of the lawsuit 
may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the 
defendant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit. 
See, e. g., Sargent, The SEC and the Individual Investor : 
Restoring His Confidence in the Market, 60 Va. L. Rev. 
533, 562-572 (1974); Dooley, The Effects of Civil Lia-
bility on Investment Banking and the New Issues Mar-
ket, 58 Va. L. Rev. 777, 822-843 (1972) . 
Congress itself recognized the potential for nuisance 
or "strike" suits in this type of litigation, and in the 1934 
Act amended § 11 of the 1933 Act to provide that : 
" In any suit under this or any other section of this 
Title the Court may, in its discretion, require an 
undertaking for the payment of the costs of such 
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suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees .... " ( 48 
Stat. 881, 908.) 
Senator Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate Banking and 
Finance Committee, in introducing Title II of the 1934 
Act on the floor of the Senate, stated in explaining the 
amendment to § 11 (e) that "[t]his amendment is the 
most important of all." 78 Cong. Rec. 8669. Among 
its purposes was to provide "a defense against blackmail 
suits." Ibid. 
Where Congress in those sections of the 1933 Act 
which expressly conferred a private cause of action for 
damages, adopted a provision uniformly regarded as de-
signed to deter "strike" or nuisance actions, Cohen v. 
Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 548-549, that fact 
alone justifies our consideration of such potential in de-
termining the limits of the class of plaintiffs who may 
sue in an action wholly implied from the language of the 
1934 Act. 
The potential for possible abuse cf the liberal dis- ~ 
covery provisions of the federal rules may likewise exist 
in this type of case to a greater extent than they do in 
other litigation. The prospect of extensive deposition of 
the defendant's officers and associates and the concomi-
tant opportunity for exte~nsive discovery of business doc-
uments, is a common occurrence in this and similar types 
of litigatiOn. To the extent that this process eventually 
produces relevant evidence which is useful in determining 
the merits of the claims asserted by the parties, it bears 
the imprimatur of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and of the many cases liberally interpreting them. But 
to the extent that It permits a plaintiff with a largely 
groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number 
of other people. ;ith the right to do so representing an 
in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rathet· 
than a reasonably founded hope that the process will 
reveal relevant evidence. it is a social cost rather than a 
1 
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benefit. Yet to broadly expand the class of plaintiffs 
who may sue under Rule lOb-5 would appear to encour-
age the least appealing aspect of the use of the discovery 
rules. 
Without the Birnbaum rule, an action under § lOb-5 
will turn largely on which oral version of a series of oc-
currences the jury may decide to credit, and therefore no 
matter how improbable the allegations of the plaintiff, 
the case will be virtually impossible to dispose of prior 
to trial other than by settlement. In the words of Judge 
Hufstedler's dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals: 
"The great ease with which plaintiffs can allege the 
requirements for the majority's standing rule and 
the greater difficulty that plaintiffs are going to have 
proving the allegations suggests that the majority's 
rule will allow a relatively high proportion of 'bad' 
cases into court. The risk of strike suits is particu- , 
larly high in such cases; although they are difficult 
to prove at trial, they are even more difficult to dis-
pose of before trial." 492 F. 2d, at 147 n. 9. 
The Birnbaum rule, on the other hand, permits ex-
clusion prior to trial of those plaintiffs who were not 
themselves purchasers or sellers of the stock in question. 
The fact of pur~hase of stock and the fact of sale of 
stock are generally matters which are verifiable by docu-
mentation, and do not depend upon oral recollection, so 
that failure to qualify under the Birnbaum rule is a mat-
ter that can normally be established by the defendant 
either on a motion to dismiss or on a motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
Obviously there is no general legal principle that courts 
in fashioning substantive law should do so in a manner 
which makes it easier, rather than more difficult, for a 
defendant to obtain a summary judgment. But in this 
type of litigation, where the mere existence of an un-
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resolved lawsuit has settlement value to the plaintiff not 
only because of the possibility that he may prevail on 
the merits, an entirely legitimate component of settle-
ment value, but because of the threat of extensive dis-
covery and disruption of normal business activities 
which may accompany a lawsuit which is ground-
less in any event, but cannot be proven so before trial, 
such a factor is not to be totally dismissed. The Birn-
baum rule undoubtedly excludes plaintiffs who have in 
fact been damaged by violations of Rule lOb-5, and to 
that extent it is undesirable. But it also separates in a 
readily demonstrable manner the group of plaintiffs who 
actually purchased or actually sold, and whose version 
of the facts is therefore more likely to be believed by 
the trier of fact, from the vastly larger world of potential 
plaintiffs who might successfully allege a claim but could 
seldom succeed in proving it, And this fact is one of its 
advantages. 
The second ground for fear of vexatious litigation is 
based on the coucern that, given the generalized contours 
of liability, the abolition of the Birnbaum rule would 
throw open to the trier of fact many rather hazy issues 
of historical fact the proof of which depended almost 
entirely on oral testimony. We in no way disparage the \ 
worth and frequent high value of oral testimony when 
we say that dangers of its abuse appear to exist in this 
type of action to a peculiarly high degree. The brief 
I 
{ ut~· 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, while op-
posing the adoption of the Birnbaum rule by this Court, 
states that it agrees with petitioners "that the effect, if 
any, of a deceptive practice on someone who has neither 
purchased nor sold securities may be more difficult to 
demonstrate than is the effect on a purchaser or seller." 
Brief,· pp. 24-25. The brief also points out that frivo-
lous suits can be brought whatever the rules of standing, 
and reminds us of t,his Court's recognition "in a different 
' . 
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context" that "the expense and annoyance of litigation is 
'part of the social burden of living under government.'" 
Petroleum Exploratwn, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 
304 U. S. 209, 222. The Commission suggests that in 
particular cases additional requirements of corroboration 
of testimony and more limited measure of damages 
would correct the dange1s of an expanded class of 
plaintiffs. 
But the very necessity, or R.t least the desirability, 
of fashioning unique rules of corroboration and damages 
as a correlative to the abolition of the Birnbaum rule 
suggests that the rule itself may have something to be 
said for it. 
In considering the policy underlying the Birnbaum 
rule, it is not inappropriate to advert briefly to the tort 
of misrepresentation and deceit, to which a claim under 
§ lOb-5 certainly has some relationship. Originally 
under the common law of England such an action was 
not available to one other than a pRrty to a business 
transaction. That limitation was eliminated in Pasley 
v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789). 
Under the earlier law the misrepresentation was generally 
required to be one of fact, rather than opinion, but that 
requirement, too, was gradually relaxed. Lord Bowen's 
famous comment in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, that "the 
state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his 
digestion," 1882, L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 359, suggests that this 
distinction, too, may have been somewhat arbitrary. 
And it has long been established in the ordinary case of 
deceit that a misrepresentation which leads to a refusal 
to purchase or to sell is actionable in just the same way 
as a representation which leads to the consummation of 
a purchase or sale. Butler v. Watkins, 9 Wall. 815 
( 1871) . These aspects of the evolution of the tort of 
deceit and misrepresentation suggest a direction away 
from rules such as B·irnbaum, 
' . 
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But the typical fact situation in which the classic tort 
of misrepresentatiOn and deceit evolved was light years 
away from the world of commercial transactions to which 
Rule lOb-5 is applicable. The plaintiff in Butler, supra, 
for example, claimed that he had held off the market a 
patented machine for tying cotton bales which he had 
developed by reason of the fraudulent representations of 
the defendant. But the report of the case leaves no I 
doubt that the plaintiff and defendant met zi&._ one 
another in New Orleans, that one presented a draft agree-
ment to the other, and that letters were exchanged 
relating to that agreement. Although the claim to dam-
ages was based on an allegedly fraudulently induced 
decision not to put the machines on the market, the plain-
tiff and the defendant had concededly been engaged in 
the course of business dealings with one another, and 
would presumably have recognized one another on the 
street had they met. 
In today's universe of transactions governed by the ) 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12rivity of dealing or 1 ~ -· ...._ ,.., 
even personal contact between potential defendant and ~ .....,-.-...-.,_ 
potential plaintiff is the except.ion and not the rule. The 
stock of issuers is listed on financial exchanges utilized by 
tens of millions of investors and corporate representa-
tions reach a potential audience, encompassing not only 
the diligent few who peruse filed corporate reports or the 
sizable number of subscribers to financial journals, but 
the readership of the Nation's daily newspapers. Obvi-
ously neither the fact that issuers or other potential de-
fendants under Rule lOb-5 reach a large number of po-
tential investors, or the fact that they are required by 
law to make their disclosures conform to certain stand-
ards, should m any way absolve them from liability for 
misconduct which 1s proscribed by Rule lOb-5. 
But in the absence of the Birnbaum rule, it would be I 
sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that he had failed to 
purchase or sell stock by reason of a defendant's violation 
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of Rule lOb-5. The manner in which the defendant's 
violation caused the plaintiff to fail to act could be as a 
result of the reading of a prospectus, as respondent claims 
here, but it could just as easily come as a result of a 
claimed reading of information contained in the financial 
pages of a local newspaper. Plaintiff'f? proof wo!!,ld not 
be that he purchased or sold stock, a fact which would be 
capable of documentary verification in most situations, 
but instead that he decide not purchase or sell stock. 
Plaintiff's entire testimony could be epen ent upon un~ 
corroborated oral evidence of many of the crucial ele~ 
ments of his claim, and still be sufficient to go to the 
jury. The jury would not even have the benefit of 
weighing the plaintiffs version against the defendant's 
version, since the elements to which the plaintiff would 
testify would be in many cases totally unknown and un-
knowable to the defendant. The very real risk in per-
mitting those in respondent's position to sue under Rule 
lOb-5 is that the door will be open to recovery of sub-
stantial damages on the part of one who offers only his 
own testimony to prove that he ever consulted a 
prospectus of the issuer, that he paid any attention to it, 
or that the representations contained in it damaged him.8 
8 The SEC, recognizing the necessity for limitations on non-
purchaser, nonseller plain1iffs in the absence of the Birnbaum rule, 
suggests two such limitations to mitiga.te the practical adverse 
effects flowing from abolition of the rule. First it suggests requir-
ing some corroborative evidence in addition to oral testimony 
tending to show that the mvestment decision decision of a plaintiff 
was affected by an omission or misrepresentation. SEC Brief, at 
25-26. Apparently ownership of stock or receipt of a prospectus 
or press release would bP. sufficient corroborative evidence in the 
view of the SEC to reach the jury. We do not believe that such 
a requirement would adequately respond to the concerns in part 
underlying the Birnbaum rulP.. Ownership of stock or receipt of a 
prospectus says little about whether a plaintiff's investment decision 
was affected by a violatwn of Rule lOb-5 or whether a decision 
was even made. Second, the SEC would limit the vicarious liability 
' . 
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The virtue of the Birnbaum rule, simply stated, in this I 
situation, is that it litmts the class of plaintiffs to those 
who have at least dealt m the security to which the 
prospectus, representation, or omission relates. And 
their dealing in the security, whether by way of purchase 
or sale, will generally be an objectively demonstrable 
fact in an are11. of the law otherwise very much de 
pendent upon oral testimony. As Judge Hufstedler said 
dissenting from the majority's opinion for the Court of 
Appeals in this case : 
"The passive investor could always await market 
developments without any risk, claiming deception 
caused non-buying if the value of the securities 
proved more promising than the offeror's glum pre-
dictions and deception caueed nonselling if a rosier 
prospectus was followed by a market decline. Mean-
while securities offercrs would be hard pressed to 
find language for prospectuses that would be suffi:.. 
c1ently neutral to avoid potenti91 damage suits 
from bystanders." 492 F. 2d, at 148. 
While much of the development of the law of deceit 
of corporatl' issuers to nonpurcha~ers and nonsellers to situations 
where the corporate Issuer has been unjustly enriched by a violation. 
We have no occasion to pass upon the compat ibility of this limita-
tion with § 20 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U S. C. § 78t (a) . We do 
not believe that this proposed limitation is relevant to the concerns 
underlying in part the Birnbaum rule as we have expressed them. 
We are not alone in feeling that the limitations proposed by the 
SEC are not adequate to deal with the adverse effects which would 
flow from abolition of the Bzrnbaum rule. See, e. g., Vine v. Bene-
ficial Finance Co., 374 F. 2d 627, 636 (CA2), cert. denied, 389 
U S. 970 (1967) ; lroquozs Industries Inc . v. Syracu.se China Corp., 
417 F. 2d 963, 967 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 399 U. S. 909 (1970) ; 
Rekant v. Desser, 425 F. 2d 872, 879 (CA5 1970); GAF Co.rp v. 
M ilstem, 453 F . 2d 709, 721 ( CA2 1971) , cert . denied, 406 U. S. 
910 (1972) ; Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F. 2d 722, 736, 738 (CA2 
1972) (in bane); Mount Clements lndu.stries, Inc" v. Bell, 464 F. 
2d 339, 341 (CA9 1972) 
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has been the elimination of artificial barriers to recovery 
on just claims, we are not the first court to express con-
cern that the inexorable broadening of the class of plain-
tiff who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately 
result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, Chief Judge 
Cardozo observed with respect to "a liability in an inde-
terminate amount for an indeterminate time to an inde-
terminate class" that : 
"The hazards of a business conducted on these terms 
are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw 
may not exist in the implication of the duty that 
exposes to these consequences." 174 N. E., at 444. 
In Herpich v. Wa!lace, 430 F. 2d 792, 804-805 (CA5 
1970), a case adopting the Birnbaum limitation on the 
class of plaintiffs who might bring an action for damages 
based on a violation of Rule lOb-5, Judge Ainsworth 
expressed concern similar to those expressed by Chief 
Judge Cardozo. Judge Stevens, writing in Eason v. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp., CA7, 490 F. 2d 654, 
stated that court's view that these concerns were un-
duly emphasized, and went on to say that "We may not 
for that reason reject what we believe to be a correct 
interpretation of the statute or the rule." 490 F. 2d, at 
660. He relied in part on the view that Rule lOb-5 
should be interpreted, in keeping with this Court's re-
peated admonition, "not technically and restrictively, 
but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." Affi-li-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151 
(1972). 
We quite agree that if CoPgress had legislated the 
elements of a private cause of action for damages, the 
duty of the Judicial Branch would be to administer the 
law which Congress enacted; the j11diciary may not cir-
cumscribe a right which Congress has conferred because 
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the wisdom of creating so expansive a liability. But as ( 
we have pointed out, we are not dealing here with the 
interpretation of the express language of § lOb or of 
Rule lOb-5 conferring a private cause of action. N·o 
Ian ua e in either of those provisions speaks at all to the' 
contours o a nrivate cause o ac wn or t eir violation. 
However fl";xibly we may construe the language of both 
provisions, nothing in such construction militates against 
the Birnbaum rule. We are dealing with a private cause 
of action which has been judicially found to exist, and 
which will have to be judicially delimited one way or 
another unless and until Congress addresses the ques-
tion. Given the peculiar blend of legislative, adminis-
trative, and judicial history which now surrcunds Rule 
lOb-5, we believe that practical factors to wh~ch we have 
adverted, and to which other courts have referred, ~re 
entitled to a good deal of weight. 
Thus we conclude that what may be called considera-
tions of policy, which ~ are free to weigh in deciding 
this case, are by no means entirely on one side or the 
scale. Taken together with the precedental support for 
theBirnbaum rule over a period of more than 20 years, 
and the consistency of that rule with what we can glean 
from the intent of Congress, they lead us to conclude 
that it is a sound rule and should be followed, 
IV 
The majority of the Court of Appeals in this case 
expressed no disagreement with the general proposition 
that one asserting a claim for damages based on the vio-
lation of Rule lOb-5 must be either a purchaser or seller 
of securities. However, it noted that prior cases have 
held that persons owning contractual rights to buy or 
sell securities are not excluded by the Birnbaum rule. 
Relying on these cases, it' concluded that respond~ 
ent's status as an offeree pursuant to the terms of the 
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consent decree served the same function, for purposes 
of delimiting the class of plaintiffs, as is normally per-
formed by the requirement of a contractual relationship. 
492 F. 2d, at 142. 
The Court of Appeals recognized, and respondent con-
cedes here,0 tha.t a well-settled line of authority from 
this Court establishes that a consent decree is not en- (. 
forceable directly or in collateral proceedings by those 
who are not parties to it even though they were intended 
to be benefited by it. United States v. Armour and Co·. , 
402 U. S. 673 (1971); Buckeye Co. v. Hocking Valley 
Co., 269 U. S. 42 (1925).10 
A contract to purchase or sell securities is expressly 
defined by§ 3 (a.) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 78c (a),u 
as a purchase or sale of securities for the purposes of that 
Act. Unlike respondent, who had no contractual right 
or duty to purchase Blue Chip's securities, the holders of 
puts, calls, options and other contractual rights or duties 
to purchase .or sell securities have been recognized as 
"purchasers" or "sellers" of securities for purposes of 
Rule 10b-5, not because of a judicial conclusion that 
they were similarly situated to "purchasers" or "sellers/' 
but because the definitional provisions of the 1934 Act 
themselves grant them such a status. 
Even if we were to accept the notion that the Birn,.. 
0 See Respondent's Brief, at 60. 
10 See n. 1, supra; 492 F. 2d, at 144 n. 3 (Opinion of Hufstedler, 
J., dissenting). 
11 Section 3 (a) (13) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (13) 
provides: 
66The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, 
purchase, or otherwise acquire." 
Section 3 (a) (14) of t.he 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14) 
provides: 
1'The terms 'sale' and 'sell' e.ach incl~de any contJact tp sell ~J 
otherwise dispose of." 
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baum rule could be circumvented on a case-by-case basis 
through particularized judicial inquiry into the facts sur-
rounding a complaint, this respondent and the members 
of his alleged class would be unlikely candidates for such 
a judicially created exception. While the Birnbaum 
rule has been flexibly interpreted by lower federal 
courts,12 we have been unable to locate a single decided 
case from any court in the 20-odd years of litigation 
since the Birnbaum decision which would support the 
right of persons who were in the position of respondent 
here to bring a private suit under Rule 10b-5. Respond-
ent was not only not a buyer or seller of any security 
but it was not even a shareholder of the corporate 
petitioners. 
As indicated, the 1934 Act, under which respondent 
seeks to assert a cause of action, is general in scope but 
chiefly concerned \Vith the regulation of post-distribution 
trading on the Nation's stock exchanges and securities 
trading markets. The 1933 Act is a far narrower statute 
chiefly concerned with disclosure and fraud in connection 
•with offerings of securities-primarily, as here, initial 
distributions of newly issued stock from corporate issu-
ers. 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 130-131 (1961). 
Respondent, who derives no entitlement from the anti-
trust consent decree a.nd does not otherwise possess any 
contractual rights relating to the offered stock, stands in 
the same position as any other disappointed offeree of 
a stock offering registered under the 1933 Act who claims 
that an overly pessimistic prospectus, prepared and dis-
tributed as required by §§ 5, 10 of the 1933 Act, has 
caused it to allow its opportunity to purchase to pass. 
12 Our decision in SEC v. Nationol Securities, Inc ., 393 U. S. 453 
(1969), established thnt the purchaser-seller rule imposes no limita-
tion on the standing of the SEC to bring actions for injunctive 
relief under § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 . 
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There is strong evidence that application of the Birn-
baum rule to preclude suit by the disappointed offeree 
of a registered 1933 Act offering under Rule lOb-5 fur-
thers the intention of Congress as expressed in the 1933 
Act.18 Congress left little doubt tpat its purpose in 
imposing the prospectus and registration requirements: 
of the 1933 Act was to prevent "the high pressured sales-
manship rather than careful counsel," causing inflated 
new issues, through direct limitation by the SEC of "the· 
selling arguments hitherto employed." H. R. Rep. No. 
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 8 (1933). 
"Any objection that the compulsory incorporation 
in selling literature and sales argument of substan-
tially all information concerning the issue, will 
frighten the buyer with the intricacy of the trans-
action states one of the best arguments for the pro-
vision." ld., at 8. 
The SEC, in accord with the congressional purposes, spe-· 
cifically requires prominent emphasis be given in filed 
registration statements and prospectuses to material ad-
verse contingencies. See, e. g., SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 4936, Guides for the Preparation and Filing of 
Registration Statements, p. 6, ,-r 6 (1968); Universal 
Camera Corp., 19 S. E. C. 648, 654-656 (1945); Wheat 
and Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering,. 
15 Bus. Lawyer 539, 560-562 (1960). 
u Blue Chip did not here present the question of whether an· 
implied action under § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 will 
lie for actions made 1.1 violation of the 1933 Act and the subject 
of express civil remedies under th':l 1933 Act. We therefore have 
no occasion to pass on this issue. Compare Rosenberg v. Globe Air-
craft Cm·p., 80 F. Supp. 123 (ED Pa. 1948), with Thiele v. Shields, 
131 F. Supp. 416 (SDNY 1955) . Cf. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regula-
tion 1787-1791 (1961) ; 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, at 3915-
3917 (1969); A. Bromberg, Securities La.w : Fra.ud-Rule lOb-5, 
§24 (2) (19B8) ~ 
r 
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Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act provide express 
civil remedies for misrepresentations and omissions in 
registration statements and prospectuses filed under the 
Act, as here charged, but restrict recovery to the offering 
price of shares actually purchased : 
"To impose a greater responsibility WOllld unneces-
sarily restrain the conscientious administration of 
honest business with no compensating advantage 
to the public." H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess., 9 (1933) . 
And in Title II of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
48 Stat. 905-908, the same act adopting § 10 (b), Con-
gress amended § 11 of the 1933 Act to limit still further 
the express civil remedy it conferred. See generally 
James, Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933, 32 
Mich. L. Rev. 1130, 1134 (1934). The additional con-
gressional restrictions, contained in Title II of the 1934 
Act, on the already limited express civil remedies pro-
vided by the 1933 Act for misrepresentations or omis-
sions in a registration statement or prospectus reflected 
congressional concern over the impact of even these 
limited remedies on the new issues market. 78 Cong. 
Rec. 8668-8669. There is thus ample evidence that 
Congress did not intend to extend a private cause of 
action for money damages to the nonpurchasing offeree 
of a stock offering registered under the 1933 Act for loss 
of the opportunity to purchase due to an overly pessi-
mistic prospectus. 
Beyond the difficulties evident in an ~xtension of I 
standing to this respondent, we do not believe that the 
Birnbaum rule is merely a shorthand judgment on the 
nature of a particular plaintiff's proof. As a purely 
practical matter, it is doubtless true that respondent and 
the members of its class, as offerees and recipients of the 
prospectus of New Blue Chip, are a smaller class of 
' . 
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potential plaintiffs than would be all those who might 
conceivably assert that they obtained information viola-
tive of Rule lOb-5 and attributable to the issuer in the 
financial pages of their local newspaper. And since re-
spondent likewise had a prior connection with some of 
petitioners as a result of using the trading stamps mar-
keted by Old Blue Chip, and was intended to benefit 
from the provisions of the consent decree, there is doubt-
less more likelihood that its managers read and were 
damaged by the allegedly misleading statements in the 
prospectus than there would be in a case filed by a com-
plete stranger to the corporation. 
But respondents and the members of their class are ~ 
neither "purchasers" nor "sellers," as those terms are 
defined in the 1934 Act, and therefore to the extent that 
their claim of standing to sue were recognized, it would 
mean that the lesser practiral difficulties of corroborating 
at least some elements of their proof would be regarded 
as sufficient to avoid the Birnbaum rule. While we have 
noted that these practical difficulties, particularly in the 
case of a complete stranger to the corporation, support 
the retention of that rule, they are by no means the only 
factor which does so. The general adoption of the rule 
by other federal courts in the 20·odd years since it was 
pronounced, and the consistency of the rule with the 
statutes involved and their legislative history, are like-
wise bases for retaining the rule. Were we to agree with 
the Court of Appeals m this case, we would leave the 
Btrnbaum rule open to endless case-by-case erosion de-
pending on whether a particular group of plaintiffs were 
thought by the court in which the issue was being liti-
gated to be sufficiently more discrete tha.n the world of 
potential purchasers at large to JUstify an excep~ 
tiou We do not believe that such a shifting and highly 
fact-oriented disposition of the Issue of who may bring 
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a damage claim for violation of Rule lOb-5 is a satisf~c­
tory basis for a rule of liability imposed on the conduct 
of business transactions. Nor is it as consistent as a 
straightforward application of the Birnbq,um rule with 
the other factors which support the retention of that 
rule. We therefore hold that respondent was not en-
titled to sue for violation ~f Rule lOJ:>--5, and the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
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MR. JusTrcm PowELL, concurring. 
Although I concur in the opinion of the Court, I write 
to emphasize the significance of the texts of the Acts of 
1933 and 1934 and especially the language of § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5. 
The starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself. The critical phrase 
in both the statute and the Rule is "in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 78j 
(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b- 5 (italics added). Section 3a 
(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78o (a) (14), provides 
that the term "sale" shall "include any contract to sell 
or otherwise dispose of" securities. There is no hint in 
any provision of the Act that the term "sale," as used 
in § 10 (b) , was intended- in addition to its long-
established legal meaning- to include an "offer to sell." 
Respondent, nevertheless, would have us amend the con-
trolling language in § 10 (b) to read: 
" ... in connection with the purchase or sale of, or 
an offer to sell, any security." 
Before a court properly could consider taking such liberty 
with statutory language there should be, at least, unmis-
takable support in the history and structure of the legis-
lation. None exists in this case. 
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Nothing in the history of the Securities Acts supports 
any congressional intent to include mere offers in § 10 (b). 
Moreover, as the Court's opinion indicates, impressive 
extrinsic evidence in the texts of the two Acts indicates 
clearly that Congress selectively and carefully distin-
guished between offers, purchases and sales. Section 
17 (a), the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 779 (a) , for example, expressly includes 
"offer [s]" of securities within its terms while § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act do not. The 1933 Act 
also defines "offer to sell" as something distinct from a 
sale. § 2 (3) , 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3). 
If further evidence of congressional intent were needed, 
it may be found in the subsequent history of these Acts. 
As noted in the Court's opinion, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission unsuccessfully sought, in 1957 and 
again in 1959, to persuade Congress to broaden § 10 (b) 
by adding to the critical language: "or any attempt to 
purchase or sell" any security. See ante, p. 8. 
This case involves no "purchase or sale" of securities? 
Respondents were mere offerees, who instituted this suit 
some two years after the shares were issued and after 
the market price had soared. Having "missed the mar-
ket" on a stock, they arc hardly in a unique position. 
'The capital that fuels our enterprise system comes from 
investors who have frequent opportunities to purchase, 
or not to purchase, securities being offered publicly. The 
market prices of new issues rarely remain static: almost 
invariably they go up or down, and they often fluctuate 
1 It is argued that the language "in connection with" justifies 
extending § 10 (b) to include offers which necessarily precede a 
purchase or sale. The short answer is that the statute requires a 
purchase or a sale of a security, and no offer was made to respond-
ents in connection with either. Their complaint rests upon the 
absence of a sale to or purchase by them. 
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widely in market appraisal over a period far less than 
the two years during which respondents reflected on their 
lost opportunity. Most investors have unhappy memo-
ries of decisions not to buy stocks which later performed 
well. 
The opinion of the Court, and the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Hufstedler in the Court of Appeals, correctly 
emphasize the subjective nature of the inevitable inquiry 
if the term "offer" were read into the Act and some argu-
able error could be found in an offering prospectus: 
"Would I have purchased this particular security at the 
time it was offered if I had known the correct facts?'; 
Apart from the human temptation for the plaintiff to 
answer this question in a self-serving fashion, the offeror 
of the sec~rities-defendant in the suit-is severely 
handicapped in challenging the predictable testimony.~~ 
The subjective issues would be even more speculative in 
the class actions that inevitably would follow if we held 
that offers to sell securities are covered by § 10 (b) and 
Rule lOb-5. 
In this case respondents were clearly identifiable as 
offerees, as here the shares were offered to designated 
persons.3 In the more customary public sale of securi-
·2 Proving, after the fact, what "one would have done" encom-
passes a number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would 
tho offeree have bought at all; how many shares would he have 
bought; how long would he have held the shares; were there other 
"buys" on the market at the time that they may have been more 
attractive even had the offeree known the facts; did he in fact use 
his available funds (if any) more advantageously by purchasing 
something else. 
3 It is argued that the special facts of this case justify extending 
tho benefit of § lOb-5 to these respondents, even if the statute 
ordinarily requires a purchase or a sale. But this resolution also 
would require judicial extension of the terms of the statute. The 
mere fact that securities are offered to a limited class of offerees 
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ties, identification of those who in fact were bona fide 
offerees would present severe problems of proof. The 
law requires that offers to sell registered securities be 
made by means of an effective prospectus. § 5 (b), 15 
U. S. C. § 77 (e) (b). Issues are usually marketed 
through underwriters and dealers, often including scores 
of investment banking and brokerage firms across the 
country. Copies of the prospectus may be widely dis-
tributed through the dealer group, and then passed hand-
to-hand among countless persons whose identities can-
not be known. If § 10 (b) were extended to embrace 
offers to sell, the number of persons claiming to have been 
offerees could be legion with respect to a security which 
subsequently proved to be a, rewarding investment. 
We are entitled to assume that the Congress, in enact-
ing§ 10 (b) and in subsequently declining to extend it, 
took into account these and similar considerations. The 
courts already have inferred a private cause of action 
that was not authorized by the legislation. In doing 
this, however, it was unnecessary to rewrite the precise 
'language of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b- 5. This is precisely 
what respondents- joined, surprisingly, by the SEC-
sought in this case.4 If such a far-reaching change is to 
may eliminate some of the problems of proof but it does not avoid 
the fatal objection that no offer of securities, absent a purchase or 
sitle, is covered by the statute. 
4 It is more than curious that tho SEC should seek this change 
in the 1934 Act by judicial action. The underlying philosophy of 
the 1933 Act was to promote "truth" in the marketing of securities 
to the public. The evil was the tendency of the seller to exaggerate, 
to "puff','' and sometimes fraudulently to overstate the prospects and 
earing capabilities of tho issuing corporation. The decade of the 
' 1920's was marked by financings in which the buying public was 
oversold, if not actually misled, by the buoyant optimism of issuers 
·and underwriters. The 1933 Act was intended to compel moderation 
:and caution in selling prospectuses, and this is precisely the way that 
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be made, with unpredictable consequences upon the 
process of raising capital so necessary to our economic 
w~ll-being, it is a matter for the Congress, not the courts. 
Act has been administered by the SEC for more than 40 years. 
Absolute factual accuracy with respect to a corporate enterprise is 
impossible, except with respect to certain hard facts (e. g., some 
balance sheet items). The outcome of pending litigation, the effect 
of relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of adverse 
legislation, the expenditures needed to meet escalating environmental 
regulations, the likelihood and effect of new competition or of new 
technology and many similar matters of potential relevancy, must be 
addressed in registration statements and prospectuses. In adminis-
tering the 1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently has 
encouraged and often required offerors to take conservative postures 
in prospectuses, especially with respect to judgmental and unfavor-
able matters. If a different philosophy now were to be read into 
the 1934 Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleacling understate-
ment as well as for overstatement of the issuer's prospects, the 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
Although I concur in the opinion of the Court, I write 
to emphasize the significance of the texts of the Acts of 
1933 and 1934 and especially the language of § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5. 
The starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself. The critical phrase 
in both the statute and the ftule is "in connection with .J...~ 
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 78j 
(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b- 5 (italics added). Section 3a 
(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 78o (a)(14), provides 
that the term "sale" shall "include any contract to sell 
or otherwise dispose of" securities. There is no hint in 
any provision of the Act that the term "sale," as used 
in § 10 (b) , was intended-in addition to its long-
established legal meaning- to include an "offer to sell." 
Respondent, nevertheless, would have us amend the con-
trolling language in § 10 (b) to read: 
". . . in connection with the purchase or sale of, or 
an offer to sell, any security." 
Before a court properly could consider taking such liberty 
with statutory language there should be, at least, unmis-
takable support in the history and structure of the legis-
lation. None exists in this case. 
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Nothing in the history of the Securities Acts supports 
any congressional intent to include mere offers in § 10 (b). 
Moreover, as the Court's opinion indicates, impressive 
extrinsic evidence in the texts of the two Acts indicates 
clearly that Congress selectively and carefully distin- Ft. l 
guished between offers, purchases and sales. Be~ or- e..X.'dVVtp ~.J .§ 
17 (a) , the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 77 (a), -i9r emultpl~ expressly includes 
"offer[s]" o securities within its terms while § 10 (b) 
0~ ik l't~4 ;tJ. _ _,_, and Rule 10b- 5 sf the 19iH Ae~ do not. The 1933 Act 
also defines "offer to sell" as something distinct from a 
sale. § 2 (3) , 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3). 
If further evidence of congressional intent were needed, 
it may be found in the subsequent history of these Acts. 
As noted in the Court's opinion, the Securities and Ex-
·change Commission unsuccessfully sought, in J957 and 
again in 1959, to persuade Congress to broaden § 10 (b) 
by adding to the critical language: "or any attempt to 
purchase or sell" any security. See ante, p. 8. 
This case involves no "purchase or sale" of securities? 
Respondents were mere offerees, who instituted this suit 
some two years after the shares were issued and after 
the market price had soared. Having "missed the mar-
ket" on a stock, they are hardly in a unique position. 
·The capital that fuels our enterprise system comes from 
·investors who have frequent opportunities to purchase, 
· or not to purchase, securities being offered publicly. The 
market prices of new issues rarely remain static: almost 
invariably they go up or down, and they often fluctuate 
1. It is argued that the language "in connection with" justifies 
extending § 10 (b) to include offers which necessarily precede a 
purchase or sale. The short answer is that the statute requires a 
purchase or a sale of a security, and no offer was made to respond-
ents in connection with either. Their complaint rests upon the 
~ of a sale to or purchase by them. 
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:widely i+l 1C8&Fl£et 8/j9f!P&isti. over a period far less than 
the two years during which respondents reflected on their 
lost opportunity. Most investors have unhappy memo-
ries of decisions not to buy stocks which later performed 
:well. 
The opinion of the Court, and the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Hufstedler in the Court of Appeals, correctly 
emphasize the subjective nature of the inevitable inquiry 
if the term "offer" were read into the Act and some argu-
able error could be found in an offering prospectus: 
"Would I have purchased this particular security at the 
time it was offered if I had known the correct facts?" 
Apart from the human temptation for the plaintiff to 
answer this question in a self-serving fashion, the offeror 
of the securities-defendant in the suit-is severely 
handicapped in challenging the predictable testimony.21 
The subjective issues would be even more speculative in 
the class actions that inevitably would follow if we held 
that offers to sell securities are covered by § 10 (b) and 
Rule lOb-5. 
In this case respondents were clearly identifiable as 
offerees, as here the shares were offered to designated 
persons.3 In the more customary public sale of securi-
·2 Proving, after the fact, what "one would have done" encom-
passes a number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would 
the offeree have bought at all; how many shares would he have 
bought; how long would he have held the shares; were there other 1 
"buys" on the market at the time that ~may have been more_J 
attractive even had the offeree known the facts; did he in fact use 
his available funds (if any) more advantageously by purchasing 
something else. 
3 It is argued that the special facts of this case justify extending 
the benefit of § lOb-5 to these respondents, even if the statute 
ordinarily requires a purchase or a sale. But this resolution also 
would require judicial extension of the terms of the statute. The 
mere fact that securities are offered to a limited class of offerees 
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ties, identification of those who in fact were bona fide 
offerees would present severe problems of proof. The 
J. ~requires that offers to sell registered securities be.J 
made by means of an effective prospectus. § 5 (b), 15 
U. S. C. § 77 (e) (b). Issues are usually marketed 
through underwriters and dealers, often including scores 
of investment banking and brokerage firms across the 
country. Copies of the prospectus may be widely dis-
tributed through the dealer group, and then passed hand-
to-hand among countless persons whose identities can-
not be known. If § 10 (b) were extended to embrace 
offers to sell, the number of persons claiming to have been d ~ 
offerees could be legion with respect to security ~ 
subsequently proved to be a rewarding investment. '{ r 'i~,:at 
We are entitled to assume that the Congress, in enact-
Ing § 10 (b) and in subsequently declining to extend it, 
took into account these and similar considerations. The 
courts already have inferred a private cause of action 
that was not authorized by the legislation. In doing 
.~his, however, it was unnecessary to rewrite the precise e~ea !-tl u 
language of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. This is ~Pe~sel,.;: ..J 
what respondents-joined, surprisingly, by the SEC-
sought in this case:1 If such a far-reaching change is to 
may eliminate some of the problems of proof but it does not avoid_...----
the fatal objection that no offer of securities, absent a purchase or 
sale, is covered by the statute. 
n IS more than curious that the SEC'Should seek this change 
in the 1934 Act by judicial action. The underlying philosophy of 
'the 1933 Act was to promote "truth" in the marketing of securities 
to the public. The evil was the tendency of the seller to exaggerate, ~ 
to "puff," and sometimes fraudulently to overstate the prospects and 
earing capabilities of the issuing corporation. The decade of the 
1920's was marked by financings in which the buying public was 
oversold, if not actually misled, by the buoyant optimism of issuers 
and underwriters. The 1933 Act was intended to compel moderation 
and caution in selling prospectuses, and this is precisely the way that 
,, 
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be made, with unpredictable consequences upon the 
process of raising capital so necessary to our economic 
well-being, it is a matter for the Congress, not the courts. 
-Act hnrDeen administered by the SEC for more than 40 years. 
Absolute factual accuracy with respect to a corporate enterprise is 
impossible, except with respect to certain hard facts (e. g., some 
balance sheet items). The outcome of pending litigation, the effect 
of relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of adverse 
legislation, the expenditures needed to meet escalating environmental 
regulations, the likelihood and effect of new competition or of new 
technology and many similar matters of potential relevancy, must be 
addressed in registration statements and prospectuses. In adminis- fL_ 
tering the 1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently has r"' ._ 
encouraged and often required offerors to take conservative postures 
in prospectuses, especially with respect to judgmental and unfavor-
able matters. If a different philosophy now were to be read into 
the 1934 Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleading understate-
ment as well as for overstatement of the issuer's prospects, the 
hazard of "going to market"-already not inconsequential-would be 
immeasurably increased. 
lfp/SS 5/15/7~ 
f) p 4 
. ' 
4. It is more than curious that the SEC should seek 
this change in the 1934 Act by judicial action. The stated 
t([t]o 
purpose of the 1933 Act was ~provide full and fair 
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate 
# 
and foreign commerc~. " 
t/ g Sfaf, 74, 
See preamble to Act) A The 
evil addressed was the tendency of the seller to exaggerate, 
to "puff", and sometime s frauduently to overstate the 
prospects and earning capabilities of the issuing corporation. 
The decade of the 1920's was marked by financings in which 
the buying public was oversold, and often misled, by the 
bouyant optimism of issuers and underwriters. The 1933 
Act was intended to compel moderation and caution in 
prospectuses, and this is precisely the way that Act has 
been administered by the SEC for more than 40 years. Precise 
factual accuracy with respect to a corporate enterprise is 
frequently impossible, except with respect to ~ hard 
facts. The outcome of pending litigation, the effect of 
relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of 
adverse legislation, the cost of projected construction 
or of entering new markets, the expenditures needed to 
2. 
meet changing environmental regulations, the likelihood 
and effect of new competition or of new technology, and many 
similar matters of potential relevancy must be addressed 
in registration statements and prospectuses. In adminis-
tering the 1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently 
ha s encouraged and often required offerors to take con-
servative postures in prospectuses, especially with respect 
to judgmental and possibly unfavorable matters. If a 
different philosophy now were to be read into the 1934 
Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleading understate-
ment as well as for overstatement of the issuer's prospects, 
the hazard of "going to market" - already not inconsequential -
would be immeasurably increased. 
1st DRAFT 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
Although I concur in the opinion of the Court, I write 
to emphasize the significance of the texts of the Acts of 
1933 and 1934 and especially the language of § 10 (b) 
and Rule lOb-5. 
The starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself. The critical phrase 
in both the statute and the rule is "in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 78j 
(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (italics added). Section 3a 
(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78o (a) (14), provides 
that the term "sale" shall "include any contract to sell 
or otherwise dispose of" securities. There is no hint in 
any provision of the Act that the term "sale," as used 
in § 10 (b), was intended-in addition to its long-
established legal meaning-to include an "offer to sell." 
Respondent, nevertheless, would have us amend the con-
trolling language in ~ 10 (b) to read : 
" ... in connection with the purchase or sale of, or 
an offer to sell, any security." 
Before a court properly could consider taking such liberty 
with statutory language there should be, at least, unmis-
takable support in the history and structure of the legis-
la~iou. NQne exis.ts in this caae. 
.-
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Nothing in the history of the Securities Acts supports 
any congressional intent to include mere offers in§ 10 (b). 
Moreover, as the Court's opinion indicates, impressive 
extrinsic evidence in the texts of the two Acts indicates 
clearly that Congress selectively and carefully distin· 
guished between offers, purchases and sales. For example, 
§ 17 (a), the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, 15 
U. S. C. ~ 77q (a), expressly includes "offer[s]" of securi-
ties within its terms while § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and 
Rule 10b-5 do not. The 1933 Act also defines "offer to 
sell" as something distinct from a sale. § 2 (3), 15 
U. S. C. ~ 77b (;3). 
If further evidence of cougressional intent were needed, 
it may be found in the subsequent history of these Acts. 
As noted in the Court's opinion, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission unsuccessfully sought, in 1957 and 
again in 1959, to persuade Congress to broaden § 10 (b) 
by adding to the critical language: "or any attempt to 
purchase or sell" any security. See ante, p. 8. 
This case involves no "purchase or sale" of securities.1 
Respondents were mere offerees, who instituted this suit 
some two years after the shares were issued and after 
the market price had soared. Having "missed the mar· 
ket" on a stock, they are hardly in a unique position. 
The capital that fuels our enterprise system comes from 
investors who have frequent opportunities to purchase, 
or not to purchase, securities being offered publicly. The 
market prices of new issues rarely remain static: almost 
Invariably they go up or down, and they often fluctuate 
1 It is argued that the language "in connection with" justifie5 
extending § 10 (b) to include offers which necessarily precede a 
purchase or sale. The short answer 1s that the statute require:, a 
purchase or a sale of a ::;ecurity, and no offer was made to respond-
ents in connection with either. Their complaint rests upon the 
absence of a sale to or purchase by them. 
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widely over a period far less than the two years during 
which respondents reflected on their lost opportunity. 
Most investors have unhappy memories of decisions not 
to buy stocks which later performed well. 
The opinion of the Court, and the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Hufstedler in the Court of Appeals, correctly 
emphasize the subjective nature of the inevitable inquiry 
if the term "offer" were read into the Act and some argu-
able error could be found in an offering prospectus: 
"Would I have purchased this particular security at the 
time it was offered if I had known the correct facts?" 
Apart from the human temptation for the plaintiff to 
answer this question in a self-serving fashion, the offeror 
of the securities-defendant in the suit-is severely 
handicapped in challenging the predictable testimony.~ 
The subjective issues would be even more speculative in 
the class actions that inevitably would follow if we held 
that offers to sell securities are covered by § 10 (b) and 
Rule lOb-5. 
In this case respondents were clearly identifiable as 
offerees, as here the shares were offered to designated 
persons.8 In the more customary public sale of securi-
2 Proving, after the fact, what "one would have done" encom-
pas~es a number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would 
the offeree have bought at all; how many shares would he have 
bought; how long would he have ht>ld the shares; were there· 
other "buys" on the market at the time that may have been more 
attractive even had the offeree known the facts ; did he in fact use 
his available funds (if any) more advantageously by purchasing· 
something else. 
3 It is argued that the special facts of this case justify extending-
the benefit of § lOb-5 to these respondents, even if the statute 
ordinarily requires a purchase or a sale. But this resolution also 
would require judicial extension of the terms of the statute. The 
mere fact that securities are offered to a limited class of offerees 
:may clim.imte SQille of the rro'ble!IliiS llllf proof but it dDes :mot avoi.Ql 
' . 
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ties, identification of those who in fact were bona fide 
offerees would present severe problems of proof. The 
1933 Act requires that offers to sell registered securities 
be made by means of an effective prospectus. ~ 5 (b), 15 
U. S. C. § 77 (e) (b). Issues are usually marketed 
through underwriters and dealers. often including scores 
of investment banking and brokerage firms across the 
country. Copies of the prospectus may be widely dis-
tributed through the dealer group, and then passed hand-
to-hand among countless persons whose identities can-
not be known. If § 10 (b) were extended to embrace 
offers to sell, the number of persons claiming to have been 
offerees could be legion with respect to any security that 
subsequently proved to be a rewarding investment. 
We are entitled to assume that the Congress, in enact-
ing § 10 (b) and in subsequently declining to extend it, 
took into account these and similar considerations. The 
courts already have inferred a private cause of action 
that was not authorized by the legislation. In doing 
this . however, it was unnecessary to rewrite the precise 
language of§ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. This is exactly 
what respondents-joined, surprisingly, by the SEC-
sought in this case. 1 If such a far-reaching change is to 
the fatal obJection that no offer of Recurities, ab~ent a purchase or 
sale, is eoverrd by thr statutr 
1 It. i~; more 1 han euriou~ 1 ha I the SEC should R<.>ek thiR change in 
the 1934- Ad by .i\l(lirial artion. The ~Stated purpose of the 1933 
Art wa" ''it]o providr full and fair diRclo~ure of the character of 
securitir" Hold in intrr~ta1e and forPJgn commPrrc .... " See pre-
amble to Art, 41\ Stat. 74. Thr Pvil addrPssed was the tendency of 
the "eller to exaggPrn1 e, to "puff," and ;;omPtimcF< fraudulently to 
O\'f'r~tate 1hP pro:;pf'etfl and Parning capabilities of the i~~uing corpo-
rution . The dPradc of the 1920's wn:; marhd by financings in 
whieh tlw buying pnhlie was oversold, and oftrn misled, by the 
bouyant optimi,.;m of is~Uf'l'~ and underwritt'rs. The 1933 Act was 
intended to compel moderation and caution in pro~;pcctu~e~:>, and this 
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be made, with unpredictable consequences upon the 
process of raising capital so necessary to our economic 
well-being, it is a matter for the Congress, not the courts. 
is precisely the way that Act has been administered by the SEC 
for more than 40 years. Precise factual accuracy with respect to 
a corporate entrrprise is frequrntly impossible, except with respect 
to hard facts . The outcome of pending litigation, the effect of 
relatively new legislation, the possiblr enactment of adverse legisla-
tion, the cost, of projrctrd construction or of entering new markets, 
the expenditures nrrded to meet changing environmental regulations, 
the likelihood and effect of new comprtition or of new technology, 
and many similar matter~ of potential relevancy must be addressed 
in registration statements m1d prospectusPs. In administering the 
1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently has encouraged and 
often required offerors to take couservative postures in prospectuses, 
e>8pecially with rrspect to judgmental and possibly unfavorable· 
matters . If a different philosophy now were to be read into the 
1934 Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleading understatement 
as well as for overstatement of the issurr's prosprcts, the hazard of 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
Although I concur in th~ opinion of the Court, I write 
to emphasize the significance of the texts of the Acts of 
1933 and 1934 and especially the language of § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5. 
I 
The starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself. The critical phrase 
in both the statute and the rule is "in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 78j 
(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (italics added). Section 3a 
(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14), provides } 
that the term "sale" shall "include any contract to sell 
or otherwise dispose of" securities. There is no hint in 
any provision of the Act that the term "sale," as used 
in § 10 (b), was intended-in addition to its long-
established legal meaning-to include an "offer to sell." 
Respondent, nevertheless, would have us amend the con-
trolling language in § 10 (b) to read : 
61
, •• in connection with the purchase or sale of, or 
an offer to sell, any security." 
Before a court properly could cons1der taking such liberty 
with statutory language there should be, at least, unmi~ 
takable support in the history and structure of the legis~ 
lation. None exists in this case. 
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Nothing in the history of the Securities Acts supports 
any congressional intent to include mere offers in § 10 (b) . 
Moreover, as the Court's opinion indicates, impressive 
extrinsic evidence in the texts of the two Acts indicates 
clearly that Congress selectively and carefully distin-
guished between offers, purchases and sales. For example, 
§ 17 (a), the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, 15 
U.S. C.§ 77q (a), expressly includes "offer[s]" of securi-
ties within its terms while § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and 
Rule 10b-5 do not. The 1933 Act also defines "offer to 
sell" as something distinct from a sale. § 2 (3), 15 
u. s. c. § 77b (3). 
If further evidence of congressional intent were needed, 
it may be found in the subsequent history of these Acts. 
As noted in the Court's opinion, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission unsuccessfully sought, in 1957 and 
again in 1959, to persuade Congress to broaden § 10 (b) 
by adding to the critical language: "or any attempt to 
purchase or sell" any security. See ante, p. 8. 
This case involves no "purchase or sale" of securities.1 
Respondents were mere offerees, who instituted this suit 
some two years after the shares were issued and after 
the market price had soared. Having "missed the mar-
ket" on a stock, they are hardly in a unique position . 
. Th~ capital that fuels our enterprise system comes from 
investors who have frequent opportunities to purchase, 
· or not to purchase, securities being offered publicly. The 
market prices of new issues rarely remain static: almost 
invariably they go up or down, and they often fluctuate 
1 It is argued that the language "in connection with" justifieS' 
extending § 10 (b) to include offers which necessanly precede a 
purchase or sale. The short answer is that the statute requires a 
purchase or a sale of a security, and no offer was made to respond~ 
ents in connection with either. Their complaint rests upon the 
.a,bsence of a sale to or purchase by them. 
' . 
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widely over a period far less than the two years during 
which respondents reflected on their lost opportunity. 
Most investors have unhappy memories of decisions not 
to buy stocks which later performed well. 
The opinion of the Court, and the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Hufstedler in the Court of Appeals, correctly 
emphasize the suhjective nature of the inevitable inquiry 
if the term "offer" were read into the Act and some argu-
able error could be found in an offering prospectus : 
"Would I have purchased this particular security at the 
time it was offered if I had known the correct facts?" 
Apart from the human temptation for the plaintiff to 
answer this question in a self-serving fashion, the offeror 
of the securities-defendant in the suit-is severely 
handicapped in challenging the predictable testimony.2 
The subjective issues would be even more speculative in 
the class actions that inevitably would follow if we held 
that offers to sell securities are covered by § 10 (b) and 
Rule lOb-5. 
In this case respondents were clearly identifiable as 
offerees, as here the shares were offered to designated 
persons.3 In the more customary public sale of securi-
2 Proving, after the fact, what "one would have done" encom-
pa~ses a number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would 
the offeree have bought at all; how many shares would he have 
·bought; how long would 'he have held the shares; were there 
•other "buys" on the ma1'ket at the time that may have been more 
attractive even had the offeree known the facts; did he in fact use 
his available funds (if any) more advantageously by purchasing· 
something else. 
8 It is argued that the special facts of this case justify extending 
the benefit of § lOb-5 to thcsr. respondents, even if the statute 
•ordinarily requires a purchase or a sale. But this resolution also 
would require judicial extension of the terms of the statute. The 
mere fact that secunties are offered to a limited class of offerees· 
·may eliminate sonw of the prohlems of proof but it does not avoid 
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ties, identification of those who in fact were bona fide 
offerees would present severe problems of proof. The 
1933 Act requires that offers to sell registered securities 
be made by means of an effective prospectus. § 5 (b), \ 
15 U. S. C. § 77e (b). Issues are usually marketed 
through underwriters and dealers, often including scores 
of investment banking and brokerage firms across the 
country. Copies of the prospectus may be widely dis-
tributed through the dealer group, and then passed hand-
to-hand among countless persons whose identities can-
not be known. If § 10 (b) were extended to embrace 
offers to sell, the number of persons claiming to have been 
offerees could be legion with respect to any security that, 
subsequently proved to be a rewarding investment. 
We are entitled to assume that the Congress, in enact-
ing § 10 (b) and in subsequently declining to extend it, 
took into account these and similar considerations. The 
courts already have inferred a private cause of action 
that was not authorized by the legislation. In doing 
this, however, it was unnecessary to rewrite the precise 
language of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. This is exactly 
what respondents-joined, surprisingly, by the SEC-
sought in this case:' If such a far-reaching change is to 
the fatal objection that no offer of securities, absent a purchase or 
sale, is covered by the statute. 
4 It is more than curious that ti1e SEC should seek this change in 
the 1934 Act by judicial action. The stated purpose of the 1933 
Act was "[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of 
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce .... " See pre-
amble to Act, 48 Stat. 74. The evil addressed was the tendency of 
the seller to exaggerate, to "puff," and sometimes fraudulently to 
overstate the prospects and earning capabilities of the issuing corpo-
ration. The decade of the 1920's was marked by financings in 
which the buying public was oversold, and often misled, by the 
bouyant optimism of issuers and underwriters . The 1933 Act was 
intended to compel moderation and caution in prospectuses, and this 
is · precisely the way that Act has been administered by the SEC 
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be made, with unpredictable consequences for the proc-
ess of raising capital so necessary to our economic well-
being, it is a matter for the Congress, not the courts. 
II 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN's dissent charges the Court 
with "a preternatural solicitude for corporate well being 
and a seeming callousness toward the investing public." 
Our task in this case is to construe a statute. In my 
view, the answer is plainly compelled by the language 
as well as the legislative history of the Securities Acts. 
But even if the language is not "plain" to all, I would 
have thought none could doubt that the statute can be 
read fairly to support the result the Court reaches. In-
deed, if one takes a different '.'iew-and imputes callous-
ness to all who disagree-he must attribute a lack of legal 
and social perception to the scores of federal judges who 
have followed Birnbaum for two decades. 
The dissenting opinion also chargP-s the Court with 
paying "no heed to the unremedied wrong" arising from 
the type of "fraud" that may result from reaffirmance 
for more than 40 years. Precise factual accuracy with respect to 
a corporate enterprise is frequently impossible, except with respect 
to hard facts. The outcome of pending litigation, the effect of 
relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of adverse legisla-
tion, the cost of projected construction or of entering new markets, 
the expenditures needed to mee~ changing environmental regulations, 
the likelihood and effect of new competition or of new technology, 
and many similar matters of potential relevancy must be addressed 
in registration statements and prospectuses. In administering the 
1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently has encouraged and 
often required offerors to take conservative postures in prospectuses, 
especially with respect to judgmental and possibly unfavorable 
matters . If a different philosophy now were to be read into the 
1934 Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleading understatement 
as well as for overstatement of the Issuer's prospects, the hazard of 
"going to market"-already not incoru;equential-would be immeas-
urably increased. 
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of the Birnbaum rule. If an issue of statutory construc-
tion is to be decided on the basis of assuring a federal 
remedy-in addition to state remedies-for every per-
ceived fraud, at least we should strike a balance between 
the opportunities for fraud presented by the contending 
views. It may well be conceded that Birnbaum does 
allow some fraud to go unremedied under the federal 
Securities Acts. But the construction advocated by the 
dissent could result in wider opportunities for fraud. As 
the Court's opinion makes plain, abandoning the Birn-
baum construction in favor of the rule urged by the dis-
sent would invite any person who failed to purchase a 
newly offered security that subsequently enjoyed sub-
stantial market appreciation to file a claim alleging that 
the offering prospectus understated the company's poten-
tial. The number of possible plaintiffs with respect to a 
public offering would be virtually unlimited. As noted 
above (Part I, n. 2), an honest offeror could be con-
fronted with subjective claims by plaintiffs who had 
neither purchased its securities nor seriously considered 
the investment. It frequently would be impossible to 
refute a plaintiff's assertion that he relied on the pros-
pectus, or even that he made a decision not to buy the 
offered securities. A rule allowing this type of open-
ended litigation would itself be an invitation to fraud. 5 
5 The dissent also charges that WP are callous toward the "invest-
ing public"-a term it does not define. It would have been mort 
accurate, perhaps, to have spoken of the nomnvesting public, because 
the Court's decision does not abandon the investing pubhc. The 
great majority of registered issues of securities are offered by estab-
li~hed corporations that have shares outstandmg and held by mem-
bers of the investing public. The typeR of suits that the dissent 
would encourage could result 111 large damage claims, costly litigation, 
generous settlements to avoid ::meh cost, and often-where the litiga-
tion runs its course-in large verdicts. The shareholders of the 
defendant corporatwus-th0 "investmg publir."-would ultimately 
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bear the burden of this litigation, including the fraudulent suits that 
would not be screened out by the dissent's bare requirement of a 
"logical nexus between the alleged fraud and the sale or purchase 
of a security." 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr . Ju&tice Doug1as 
Mr. ,h;stiue Brennan 
Mr. Just·ice S-:,G1nart 
Mr. Jucti.cc Vih5te 
Mr. ,Tt:stice l/,n.rshall 
Mr. Justice P well ,:/ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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MR. JusTICE BLACKBURN, dissenting. 
Today the Court graves into stone Birnbaum's 1 arbi-
trary principle of standing. For this task the Court, 
unfortunately, chooses to utilize thr<~e blunt chisels : 
(1) reliance on the legislative history of the 1933 and 
1934 Securities Acts, conceded as inconclusive in this 
particular context; (2) acceptance as precedent of two 
decades of lower court decisions following a doctrine, 
never before examined here, that was pronounced by a 
justifiably esteemed panel of that Court of Appeals re-
garded as the "Mother Court" in this area of the law/' 
but under entirely different circumstances; and (3) re-
sort to utter pi"agmaticality and a conJectural assertion 
of "policy considerations" deemed to arise in distin-
guishmg the merito~ Rule 10b-5 suit from the 
meretricious one. In f:!O doing, the Court exhibits a Rre-
ternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being and a -......... -'""'--~-seeming callousness toward the investing public quite· 
out of keepmg, it seems to me, with our own traditions 
and the intent of the secunties laws. See Affiliated Ute 
• Birnbaum v. NPwport Steel Corp, 193 F. 2d 461 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 34.11T S. 9.56 ( 1952). 
2 .lust this Term, however, we d1d not view with ~urh tender 
regard another dec1sion by the very ~;ame paneL See United States· 
v. Feola, - U S. - (1975) , and It!:! treatment of an analogy 
advanced in United States Y. Crimmw.~, 123 F . 2d 271 (CA2 1941). 
~'1.- -~ c~/2~/ ~( ~G~~~---~~ 
(I:.ez c /} c_,_l.l?.rt_t.-z___, \ 
-------
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Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151 (1972); 
Su,pt. of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 
6, 12 (1971); SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U. S. 
453, 463 (1969); Tcherepnin v.an~ 389 0. s. , 
336 (1967); SEC v. Capital Gains Burea'u, 375 U.S. 180, 
195 (1963) . 
The plaintiffs' complaint-and that is all that is before 
us now-raises ~rbing claims of fraud. It alleges 
that the directors .of 171\•Jew Blue Chip" and the majority 
shareholders of "Old Blue Chip" engaged in a deceptive 
and manipulative scheme designed to subvert the intent 
of the 1967 antitrust consent decree and to enhance the 
value of their own shares in a subsequent offering. Al-
though the complaint is too long to reproduce here, see 
App. 4-22, the plaintiffs, in short, contend that the 
much-negotiated plan of reorganization of Old Blue 
Chip, pursuant to the decree and approved by the dis-
trict court, was intended to compensate former retailer-
users of Blue Chip stamps for damages suffered as a 
result of the antitrust violations. Accordingly, the 
majority shareholders were to be divested of 55% of 
their interest; Old Blue Chip was to be merged into a 
new company; and 55% of the common shares of the new 
company were to be offered to the former users on a pro 
rata basis, determined by the quantity of stamps issued 
to each of these nonshareholding users during a desig-
nated period. Some 621,000-- shares were thus to be of-
each consisting of three shares of common 
and a $100 debenture, in return for $101 cash. 
It is the plaintiffs' pleaded position that this offer to 
the former users was intended by the antitrust court and 
the Government to be a "bargain," since the then rea~ 
sonable market value of each unit was actually $315. 
The plaintiffs alleged, however, that the offering share~ 
holders had no intention of complying in good faith with 
74-124-DISSENT 
BLUE CHIP STAMPS v. MANOR DRUG STORES 3 
the terms of the consent decree and of permitting the 
former users of Blue Chip stamps to obtain the bargain 
offering. Rather, they conspired to dissuade the offerees 
from purchasing the units by including substantially mis-
leading and negative information in the prospectus under 
the heading "Items of Special Interest." The prospectus 
contained the following statements, allegedly false and 
allegedly made to deter the plaintiffs from purchasing 
the units: (1) that "[n]et income for the current fiscal 
year will be adversely affected by payments aggregating 
$8,486,000 made since March 2, 1968, in settlement of 
claims" against New Blue Chip; (2) that net income 
"would be adversely affected by a substantial decrease 
in the use of the C0mpany's trading stamp service"; 
(3) that net income "would be adversely affected by a 
sale of one-third of the Company's trading stamp busi-
ness in California"; ( 4) that "Claims or Causes of Ac-
tion (as defined) against the Company, including pray-
ers for treble damages, now aggregate approximately 
$29,000,000"; and ( 5) that, based upon 11statistical evalu-
ations," "the Company presently estimates that 97.5%· 
of all stamps issued will ultimately be redeemed ." App, 
56. 
Plaintiffs alleged that these negative statements were 
known, or should have been known, by the defendants to 
be false since, for example, the $29,000,000 in purported 
legal claims were settled for less than $1,000,000 only 
three months later, and, as an historical fact, less than 
90% of all trading stamps are redeemed. Importantly, 
when the defendants offered their own shares for sale 
to the public a year later, the prospectus issued at that 
time made no reference to these factors even though, to 
the extent that they were relevant on the date of the 
first prospectus, one year earlier, they would have been 
equally relevant on the date of the second. As a result 
' . 
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of the defendants' negative statements, plaintiffs claim 
that they were dissuaded from exercising their option to 
purchase Blue Chip shares and that they were damaged 
accordingly. 
From a reading of the complaint in relation to the 
language of § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and of Rule lOb-5, 
it is manifest that plaintiffs have alleged the use of a 
deceptive scheme "in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security." To my mind, the word "sale" 
ordinarily and naturally may be understood to mean not 
only a single, individualized act transferring property 
from one party to another, but also the generalized event 
of public disposal of property througn advertisement, 
auction, or some other market mechanism. Here, there 
is an obvious, indeed a court-ordered, "sale" of securities 
in the special offering of New Blue Chip shares and 
debentures to former users. Yet the Court denies these 
plaintiffs the right to maintain a suit under Rule 10b-5 
because they do not fit into the mechanistic categories 
of either "purchaser" or "seller.'' This, surely, is anom~ 
aly, for the very purpose of the alleged scheme was to 
inhibit these plaintiffs from ever acquiring the status of 
"purchaser." Faced with this abnormal divergence from 
the usual pattern of securities frauds, the QQurt r>aY.§..!l.O 
hP.ed to the unremedied wrong or to the portmanteau 
nature o 1 ( ). 
The broad purpose and scope of the Securities Ex~ 
change Act of 1934 are manifest. Senator Fletcher, 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency, in introducing S. 2693. the bill that became the 
1934 Act, reviewed the general purposes of the 
legislation: 
"Manipulators who have in the past had a com-
paratively free hand to befwldle and fool the pub-
he and to extract from the public millions of dollars 
/~2-~~t 
fo ~ w~-G .. 
~~ 
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through stock-exchange operations are to be curbed 
and deprt;ed of tlie opportunity to grow fat on the 
savings of the average man and woman of America. 
Under this bill the ~ities exchanges will not only 
have the appearance of an open marketplace for in-
vestors but will be truly open to them, free from the 
hectic operations and dangerous practices which in 
the past have enabled a handful of men to operate 
with stacked cards against the general body of out-
side investors. For example, besides forbidding 
fraudulent practices and unwholesome manipulation 
by professional market operators, the bill seeks to 
deprive corporate directors, corporate officers, and 
other corporate insiders of the opportunity to play 
the stocks of their companies against the interests 
of the stockholders of their companies." 78 Cong. 
Rec. 2271 (1934). 
The Senator went on to describe the function of each of 
the many provisions of the bill, including § 9 (c) which, 
without significant alteration, became § 10 (b) of the 
Act. He said, as to this section, in terms that surely 
are broad: 
"The Commission is also given power to forbid any 
other devices in connection with security transac-
tions which it finds detrimental to the public inter-
est or to the proper protection of investors." Ibid. 
Similarly, the broad scope of the identical provision 
in the House version of the bill was emphasized by one 
of the prinCipal draftsmen, in testimony before the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 
Summing up § 9 (c), he stated: 
"Subsection (c) says, 1Thou shalt not devise any 
other cunning devices.' . . . Of course subsection 
(c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative 
' . 
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devices[.] I do not think there is any objection to 
that kind of clause. The Commission should have 
the authority to deal with new manipulative de-
vices." Testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, Hear-
ing on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 115 ( 1934). 
In adopting Rule lOb-5 in 1942, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission issued a press release stating: 
"The new rule closes a loophole in the protections against 
fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting 
individuals or companies from buying securities if they 
en~_in fraud in their purcfiase." SEC Release No: 
3230 T.l\Tay 2I, 1942). To say specifically that certain 
types of fraud are within Rule lOb-5, of course, is not 
to say that others are necessarily excluded. That this 
is so is confirmed by the apparently casual origins of the 
Rule, as recalled by a former SEC staff attorney in re-
marks made at a conference on federal securities laws 
several years ago: 
"It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I 
was sitting in my office in the S. E. C. building in 
Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor 
who was then the Director of the Trading and Ex-
change Divisien. He said, 'I have just been on the 
telephone with Paul Rowen,' who was then the 
S. E. C. Regional Administrator in Boston, 'and he 
has told me about the president of some company 
in Boston who is going around buying up the stock 
of his company from h1s own shareholders at $4.00 
a share, and he has been telling them that the com-
pany is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earn-
ings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 
a share for this coming year ls there anything 
we can do about it'?' So he came upstairs and I 
.... 
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called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10 (b) 
and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, 
and the only discussion we had there was where 'in 
connection with the purchase or sale' should be, and 
we decided it should be at the end. 
"We called the Commission and we got on the 
calendar, and I don't remember whether we got 
there that morning or after lunch. We passed a 
piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All 
the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it 
on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said 
anything except Summer Pike who said, 'Well,' he 
said, 'we are against fraud, aren't we?' That is 
how it happened." Remarks of Milton Freeman, 
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities 
Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793,922 (1967). 
The question under both Rule lOb-5 and its parent 
statute, § 10 (b), is whether fraud was employed-and 
the language is critical-by. "any person ... in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security." On the 
allegations here, the nexus between the asserted fraud 
and the conducting of a "sale" is obvious and inescap-
able, and no more should be required to sustain the 
plaintiffs' complaint against a motion to dismiss. 
The fact situation in Birnbaum itself, of course, is far 
removed from that now before the Court, for there the 
fundament of the complaint was that the controlling 
shareholder had misrepresented the circumstances of an 
attractive merger offer and then, after rejecting the 
merger, had sold his controlling shares at a price double 
their then market value to a corporation formed by 10' 
manufacturers who wished control of a captive source's 
supply when there was a market shortage. The Second 
Circuit turned aside an effort by small shareholders to· 
bring this claim of breach of fiduciary duty under Rule 
I 
74-124-DISSENT 
-g BLUE CHIP STAMPS v. MANOR DRUG STORES 
10b-5 by concluding that the Rule and § 10 (b) pro~ 
tected only those who had bought or had sold securities. 
Many cases applying the Birnbaum doctrine and con· 
tinuing critical comments from the academic world 3 fol· 
lowed in its wake, but until today the Court remained 
serenely above the fray. 
To support its decision to adopt the Birnbaum doc· 
trine, the Court points to the "longstanding acceptance 
by the courts" and to "Congress' failure to reject Birn· 
baum's reasonable interpretation of the wording of § 10 
(b)." Ante, p. 9. In addition, the Court purports to 
find support in "extrinsic evidence from the texts of the 
1933 and 1934 Acts," although it concedes this to be "not 
conclusive." Ibid. But thP- greater portion of the 
3 See, e. g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A 
New Era for Rule 10b-5, 51 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968); Boone & 
McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 
617 (1971); Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine : An Assessment, 
23 Ala. L. Rev. 543 (1971) ; Ruder, Current Developments in the 
Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue 
Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. La.w. 1289 (1971); Fuller, Another De-
mise of the Birnbaum Doctrine : "Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?", 
25 Miami L. Rev. 131 (1970); Comment, Dumping Birnbaum to 
Force Analysis of the Standing Requirement under Rule lOb-5, 6 
Loyola L. J. 230 (1975); Comment, Standing to Sue in lOb-5 Ac-
tions, 49 Notre D. Law. 1131 (1974); Comment, 10b-5 Standing 
Under Birnbaum : The Case oi the Missing Remedy, 24 Hastings 
L. J. 1007 (1973); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Requirement of 
Rule lOb-5 Re-evaluated, 44 Colo. L. Rev. 151 (1972); Comment, 
Inroads on the Necessity for a Consummated Purchase or Sale 
Under Rule lOb-5, 1969 Duke L. J. 349; Comment, The Decline 
of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule lOb-5, 14 Villanova L. 
Rev. 499 (1969) ; Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to 
SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 684 (1968) ; Comment, The 
Purchaser-Seller Rule : An Archaic Tool for Determining Standing 
Under Rule lOb-5, 56 Geo. L. J . 1177 (1968). See Note, Luniting 
the Plaintiff Class : Rule 10b-5 and the Federal Securit1es Code, 72 
Mich. L. Rev. 1398, 1412 (1974). 
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Court's opinion is devoted to its discussion of the 
"danger of vexatiousness," ante, p. 14, that accompanies 
litigation under Rule lOb-5 and that is said to be "differ-
ent in degree and in kind from that which accompanies 
litigation in general." Ibid. It speaks of harm from 
the "very pendency of the law suit," ante, p. 15, some-
thing like the recognized dilemma of the physician sued 
for malpractice; of the "disruption of normal business 
activities which may accompany a law suit," ante, p. 18; 
and of "proof ... which depend[s] almost entirely on 
oral testimony," ibid., as if all these were un~wn to 
lawsuits taking place in America's courthouses every 
day. In turning to, and being influenced by, these 
"policy considerations," ante, p. 12, or these crconsidera-
tions of policy," ante, p. 24, the Court, in my view, 
unfortunately mires itself in speculation and conjecture 
not usually seen in its opinions. In order to support an l 
interpretation that obviously narrows a provision of the ( 
securities laws designed to be a "catch-all," the Court · 
takes alarm at t e "practical difficu t1es," ante, p. 29, 
that would follow the removal of Birnbaum's barrier. 
Certainly, this Court must be aware of the realities of 
life, but it is unwarranted for the Court to take a form 
of attenuated judicial notice of the motivations that 
defense counsel may have in settling a case, or of the 
difficulties that a plaintiff may have in proving his 
claim. 
Perhaps it is true that more cases that come within the 
Birnbaum doctrine can be properly proved than those 
that fall outside it. But this is no reason for denying 
standing to sue to plaintiffs, such as those in this case, 
who allegedly are injured by novel forms of manipula-
tion. We should be wary about heeding the seductive 
call of expediency and about substituting convenience 
and ease of processing for the more difficult task of sep-
arating the genuine claim from the unfounded one. 
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Instead of the artificiality of Birnbaum, the essential 
test of a valid Rule 10b-5 claim, it seems to me, must 
be the showing of a logical nexus between the alleged 
fraud and the sale or purchase of a security. It is in-
conceivable that Congress could have intended a broad-
ranging antifraud provision, such as § 10 (b), and, at 
the same time, have intended to impose, or be deemed 
to welcome, a mechanical overtone and requirement such 
as the Birnbaum doctrine. The facts of this case, if 
proved and accepted by the factfinder, surely are within 
the conduct that Congress intended to ban. Whether 
these particular plaintiffs, or any plaintiff, will be able 
eventually to carry the burdens of proving fraud and of 
proving reliance and damage-that is, causality and 
injury-is a matter that should not be left to specula-
tions of "policy" of the kind now advanced in this 
forum so far removed from witnesses and evidence. 
Finally, I am uneasy about the type of precedent the 
present decision establishes. Policy considerations can 
be applied and utilized in like fashion in other situations. 
The acceptance of this decisional route in this case may • j-" ~ 
well come back to haunt us elsewhere before long. I ~ · 
would decide the case to fulfill the broad purpose that ~ 
the language of the statutes and the le islative history 
ictate, an I wou d av01 t e Court's pragmatic so u-
tTOn resting upon a 20-year-old, severely criticized doc-
trine enunciated for a factually distinct situation. 
In short, I would abandon the Birnbaum doctrine as a 
rule of decision in favor of a more general test of nexus, 
just as the Seventh Circuit did in Eason v. General 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F. 2d 654, 661 (1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U. S. 960 (1974). I would not worry 
about any imagined inability of our federal trial nd 
appellate courts to control the of the types of 
cases that the Court fears might result. Nor would I 
yet be disturbed about dire consequences that a basically 
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pessimistic attitude foresees if the Birnbaum doctrine : 
were allowed quietly to expire. Sensible standards of 
proof and of demonstrable damages would evolve and ' 
serye to protect. the worthY. and shut. o.ut. the frivolous ... 
